# 1AC --- Big Tech --- JCCC

## 1AC --- Platforms --- v3

### 1AC --- Advantage --- Russia

#### The United States Federal Government should substantially increase prohibitions on platform utilities by expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws to include standards against owning and competing on a platform and the acquisition of potential and/or nascent competitors

#### The plan effectively limits big tech

D'Souza, 20 (Deborah D'Souza, Deborah received her bachelor's degree in English from Fergusson College. She earned her master's degree in social anthropology at the University of Oxford and her master's degree in journalism from Columbia University., 9-12-2020, accessed on 9-1-2021, Investopedia, "Elizabeth Warren's Plan to Break Up Big Tech Explained", https://www.investopedia.com/how-will-elizabeth-warren-break-up-big-tech-4772263)//Babcii

The Plan [Among Warren's 48 plans](https://www.investopedia.com/elizabeth-warren-s-economic-plan-explained-4706529), is the "How we can break up Big Tech" plan. According to her, companies acquire smaller rivals and use their proprietary online marketplaces to unfairly limit competition. Her plan to fix this consists of two main parts and some goals for the future: Online Marketplaces = Platform Utilities Warren wants to pass legislation that requires **online marketplaces** run by companies with annual global revenue above $90 million to be designated as "**platform utilities." Companies with annual global revenue above $25 billion will not be allowed to own** platform **utilities and participants** on it at the same time. In other words, companies will not be able to sell services on a public marketplace they own and control. Platform utilities will have to treat all users fairly and equally. If sued and found guilty of violating the neutrality requirement, they would have to pay a fine equal to 5% of their annual revenue. **Reversing mergers** Warren will also appoint federal regulators who will reverse "**illegal**" and "**anti-competitive**" mergers. Goals Her three goals are to give people more control over how their personal data is collected, shared, and sold, help news outlets and artists keep more of the value their content generates, and ensure that no foreign power uses social media to influence U.S. elections. What the Plan Means for the FAANGs **Facebook**: Under Warren's plan, Facebook's 2012 acquisition of Instagram and 2014 acquisition of WhatsApp would be reversed, something Zuckerberg called an "existential" threat. "Facebook would face real pressure from Instagram and WhatsApp to improve the user experience and protect our privacy," says Warren's campaign website. Seventy percent of U.S. adults and 51% of U.S. teens use Facebook, according to [Pew Research](https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/16/facts-about-americans-and-facebook/). However, 70% of U.S. teens use Instagram, the platform Facebook is using to compete with the likes of Snap Inc. and TikTok. The company will be depending on Instagram to drive ad revenue in the coming years. **Amazon**: Amazon.com Inc. ([AMZN](https://www.investopedia.com/markets/quote?tvwidgetsymbol=amzn)) would **not be allowed to sell its own products** alongside third-party sellers on Amazon.com, if Warren's legislation is passed. Its privately-owned brands, like AmazonBasics, would have to be spun off or shuttered. Its mergers with Whole Foods (2017) and Zappos (2009) would also be unwound. Most of the hundreds of brands Amazon owns haven't had too much success, but Oweise Khazi, senior principal at Gartner L2, told [Retail Dive](https://www.retaildive.com/news/with-private-brands-amazon-plays-the-long-game/550790/) that Amazon is "playing the long game" and will be studying the massive amount of data it has access to. **Apple**: Apple Inc. ([AAPL](https://www.investopedia.com/markets/quote?tvwidgetsymbol=aapl)) is not among the companies mentioned on Warren's official campaign website, but the **AppStore would also qualify as a platform utility**. This means Apple would not be able to sell its own applications, like Apple Music and Apple News, on the platform. “It’s got to be one or the other,” said Warren when asked about it by [The Verge](https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/9/18257965/elizabeth-warren-break-up-apple-monopoly-antitrust). “Either they run the platform or they play in the store. They don’t get to do both at the same time.” This would come in the way Apple's Services business ambitions. Netflix: Netflix Inc. ([NFLX](https://www.investopedia.com/markets/quote?tvwidgetsymbol=nflx)) faces little regulatory risk at this point. In March 2019, BMO Capital Markets made Netflix its top technology stock instead of Amazon for this reason, according to [CNBC](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/15/bmo-favors-netflix-over-amazon-because-of-sen-warren.html). The debate about whether the company is a budding [monopoly](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/monopoly.asp) with its massive original content budget is still ongoing. Alphabet Inc. ([GOOGL](https://www.investopedia.com/markets/quote?tvwidgetsymbol=googl)): **Google’s Ad Exchange and** Google **Search are both platform utilities** under the proposed law and would **need to be spun off**. Alternatively, Google would have to stop including its own comparison shopping service, restaurant ratings etc. in search results, because it would be competing with other companies like Yelp, and separate its business from Ad Exchange. Its acquisitions of Waze, Nest and DoubleClick would also be unwound

#### The advantage is Russia:

#### Platform monopolies pave the way for Russian interference

Lynn, 21 (Barry Lynn, Executive director of the open markets institute. Testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition, and Consumer Rights, 3-11-21, accessed on 8-11-2021, Judiciary.senate, "Competition Policy for the Twenty-First Century The Case for Antitrust Reform.", https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Lynn%20-%20Antitrust%2021st%20C%20-%20%203-\_\_11-21%20.pdf)//Babcii

But let’s be clear. This is no isolated instance. We see this same fear to speak out in almost every corner of the American political economy today. This includes companies that depend on Amazon to get to market, including even the most powerful of book publishers. We see the same fear among the companies that depend on Google and Facebook to get to market, including even the most powerful of news publishers. We see the same fear among the companies that depend on Amazon and Google and Apple to distribute their films and music and television shows, including even the most powerful producers of art and entertainment. The breakdown of information systems. Democracy also depends on the ability of citizens to communicate freely with one another, and to deliberate with one another based on a roughly similar understanding of facts. But the combination of monopolization and discrimination is swiftly breaking down the systems Americans have long used to gather, process, share, and debate news and information with one another. Two threats especially stand out. The first is the way in which dominant intermediaries – Google and Facebook foremost – are exploiting their chokeholds to divert advertising into their own vaults, away from independent publishers. This diversion of tens of billions of dollars has resulted in the loss of tens of thousands of journalism positions across the nation. And it has resulted in the bankrupting of thousands of important publications, and the financial degradation of thousands more. The overall result is that less and less well-reported, well-edited, trustworthy information is generated in the United States as a whole, and within each individual region of the United States specifically. Open Markets was among the very first organizations to warn of this threat, in public events in the summer of 20162 and 2018.3 Since then, this threat has received a lot of attention, from policymakers and law enforcers around the world, including recent public and private antitrust lawsuits in the United States. There is some good news here. Senator Klobuchar just yesterday introduced important legislation that would provide news publishers with breathing room, while Americans work out a permanent fix to the problem. But thus far, however, no legislature has developed a mature plan to rebuild a truly open and competitive market for news and information that is not – to at some degree – ultimately regulated, manipulated, and taxed by Google and Facebook. The second threat derives from that combination of monopolization and discrimination. Here the basic problem is that Google and Facebook increasingly deliver different news, information, and advertising – including highly targeted propaganda and misinformation – to each individual citizen. Google and Facebook say that such targeted information serves the interests of each individual citizen. Whether that is true or not, the ultimate political result is an atomization of the public, to a degree that makes it ever more difficult for citizens to engage with one another through constructive political interaction, and to identify and master the great problems of our time.

#### Only the plan can solve by ending revenue capture and conflicted interests

Stoller, 19 (Matt Stoller, Matt Stoller is a fellow at the Open Markets Institute. He is writing a book on monopoly power in the 20th century for Simon and Schuster. Previously, he was a Senior Policy Advisor and Budget Analyst to the Senate Budget Committee. He also worked in the U.S. House of Representatives on financial services policy, 10-17-2019, accessed on 7-24-2021, The New York Times, "Tech Companies Are Destroying Democracy and the Free Press", https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/opinion/tech-monopoly-democracy-journalism.html)//Babcii

As the presidential election approaches, the cracks in the digital facade are once again showing. Facebook just removed an “I Love America” page, [run by Ukrainians](https://popular.info/p/massive-i-love-america-facebook-page), which pushed recycled pro-Trump imagery from the Internet Research Agency, the Russian group that tried [to influence the 2016 election](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russia-interference-election-trump-clinton.html). [As it turned out](https://popular.info/p/an-interview-with-the-ukrainians), “I Love America” wasn’t state sponsored — the Ukrainians were just running the page for the advertising money. A similar page with falsified content, “Police Lives Matter,” is [now run](https://popular.info/p/huge-police-lives-matter-facebook) out of Kosovo. These two phony Facebook pages illustrate the crisis of the free press and democracy: Advertising revenue that used to go to quality journalism is now captured by big tech intermediaries, and some of that money now goes to dishonest, low-quality and fraudulent content. This is the first presidential election happening after the business model for journalism collapsed. Advertising revenue for print newspapers has fallen by two-thirds since 2006. From 2008 to 2018, the number of newspaper reporters [dropped 47 percent](https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/09/u-s-newsroom-employment-has-dropped-by-a-quarter-since-2008/). Two-thirds of counties in America now have no daily newspaper, and [1,300 communities](https://www.poynter.org/business-work/2018/about-1300-u-s-communities-have-totally-lost-news-coverage-unc-news-desert-study-finds/) have lost all local coverage. Even outlets native to the web, like BuzzFeed and HuffPost, have laid off reporters. **This problem is a global** one; for example, in Australia from 2014 to 2018, the number of journalists in traditional print publications [fell by 20 percent](https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Digital%20platforms%20inquiry%20-%20final%20report.pdf). The signaling functions of news brands and the cultural barriers meant to guard against distorting effects of advertising have broken down. In their place, a dysfunctional information ecosystem has emerged, characterized by polarization, addiction and conspiracy theories. In Europe and in the United States, young men learn race science on YouTube. In Brazil, citizens learn [that Zika is spread by vaccines](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/11/world/americas/youtube-brazil.html?module=inline). As the Center for Humane Technology [puts it](https://humanetech.com/): “Today’s **tech platforms are caught in a race to the bottom of the brain stem** to extract human attention. It’s a race we’re all losing.” There are two drivers of this crisis. The first is the concentration of online advertising revenue in the hands of Google and Facebook — global monopolies sitting astride public discourse, diverting money that used to go to publishers to themselves. The second is an ethical breakdown — a xnatural consequence of advertising financing an information utility like a social network or search engine — which I call “conflicted communications.” It’s tempting to blame the rise of the internet for all of this, but it’s important to recognize that technology is shaped by law. Advertising, publishing and information distribution operate in publicly structured markets. In the past 40 years, the rules underlying these markets have undergone a radical reorganization. As the communications historian Richard John [argues](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674088139), for roughly 200 years (beginning with the [creation of the Post Office in 1791](https://www.amazon.com/Spreading-News-American-Postal-Franklin/dp/0674833422)), American policymakers generally sought to decentralize media power and keep communication networks neutral. In the late 1970s, policymakers reversed their presumptions. They relaxed antitrust law, eliminated the fairness doctrine and eventually allowed the creation of large media conglomerates through the [Telecommunications Act of 1996](https://www.fcc.gov/general/telecommunications-act-1996). Enabled by a loose merger policy, there was a roll-up of the internet space. From 2004 to 2014, Google spent at least $23 billion [buying 145 companies](https://www.cnbc.com/2014/08/19/googles-best-and-worst-acquisitions.html), including the advertising giant DoubleClick. And since 2004, Facebook has spent a similar amount buying 66 companies, including [key acquisitions](https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/ACCC%20Digital%20Platforms%20Inquiry%20-%20Preliminary%20Report.pdf) allowing it to attain dominance in mobile social networking. None of these acquisitions were blocked as anti-competitive. Data is now the key input into advertising: If you know who is looking at an ad, that ad space [becomes](https://prospect.org/economy/digital-advertising-markets-really-work/) much more valuable. Google and Facebook now know who is looking at every ad, and their competitors for ad dollars — newspapers — do not. Further, newspapers now must also rely on Google and Facebook to reach their customers, and hand them valuable subscriber and reader data; when The Wall Street Journal refused to abide by Google’s formatting terms, Google removed it from its search ranks and the newspaper’s traffic [dropped](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-05/wsj-ends-google-users-free-ride-then-fades-in-search-results) by 44 percent. In other words, it wasn’t just technology but also a pro-concentration philosophy that shaped the information revolution of the 1990s and 2000s. Google and Facebook grew to control important information utilities, like general search, social networking and mapping. New forms of advertising — underpinned by unregulated use of data and sold through opaque and complex auctions — then undermined the bargaining leverage of publishers and enabled new forms of fraud using bots and falsified content. A result of these policy changes is a radical centralization of power over the flow of information. Tech platforms now control online advertising revenue, which is the primary source of financing for news. But this is not just a problem of the monopolization of an industry — these new monopolists are not simply more powerful media behemoths taking share from smaller publishers. Google and Facebook are not in the journalism business at all; they are in the communications business, running information utilities with revenue that used to go to journalism. Advertising financing presents an inherent conflict of interest, because advertising is a third party paying to manipulate someone. In traditional media, advertising can influence editorial choices. There are a series of ethical structures designed to inhibit excessive control of advertisers in media industries, a result of debates for hundreds of years among public figures on the nature of advertising and publishing. Some of these include the signaling effects of differentiated news brands, a diversity of news outlets, the separation of advertising and editorial departments, and guilds to protect journalistic integrity from publishing business interests. But such ethical debates have yet to occur around information utilities. Consequently, the manifestation of the distorting effect of advertising — addiction, manipulation, fraud, tearing of a collective social fabric — has been met with little cultural immunity, policy response or institutional defenses. Before Google became an enormous advertising company, the company’s co-founders — Sergey Brin and Larry Page — [noted this problem](http://infolab.stanford.edu/~backrub/google.html). They looked at the problematic search engine market of the 1990s — with companies offering advertisers the chance to pay to be listed as an organic search result — and argued that financing a search engine business through advertising was fundamentally corrupting. Such information utilities would then have an incentive to keep users on their properties so that they could keep selling more ads. They would also have **an incentive to self-deal, putting content in front of users that benefits the utility rather than the end user.** And they would have an incentive to surveil their users, so that they could target them more effectively. Mr. Brin and Mr. Page were right about the corrupting influence of advertising. This business model of conflicted communications is where the addiction, surveillance, fraud and clickbait come from. Unfortunately, we are living in the world they foresaw. The combination of these two dynamics — the concentration of power and the new ethical quandaries presented by the financing of information networks by advertising — has created a crisis for democracy. The monopolization of ad revenue starves legitimate outlets of financing. More subtly, the signaling functions of news brands and the dense cultural barriers meant to guard against distorting effects of advertising have broken down. The task of policymakers is now to put together the ethical structures to mitigate these conflicts. The collapse of journalism and democracy in the face of the internet is not inevitable. To save democracy and the free press, **we must eliminate Google and Facebook’s control over the information commons. That means decentralizing these markets and splitting information utilities from one another so that search, mapping, YouTube and other Google subsidiaries are separate companies**, and Instagram, WhatsApp and Facebook **once again compete**. It also means barring or severely curtailing advertising on any of these platforms. Advertising revenue should once again flow to journalism and art. And people should pay directly for communications services, instead of paying indirectly by forgoing democracy.

#### Two internal links---

#### First---Interference---Vulnerabilities invite Russian exploitation

Stanage, 18 (Niall Stanage, Irish journalist and Associate Editor of the American political newspaper, 2-25-2018, accessed on 8-11-2021, TheHill, "The Memo: Russia finds weapon in US divisions", <https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/375382-the-memo-russia-finds-weapon-in-us-divisions>)

Growing political polarization in the United States is a vulnerability that foreign adversaries are exploiting — and experts worry the trend will accelerate. The threat was brought into sharp relief by the indictment of 13 Russians as part of special counsel Robert Mueller’s probe into allegations of collusion between Moscow and the 2016 Trump campaign. The Russian efforts, according to the indictment, were part of a broader effort “to sow discord in the U.S. political system,” achieved mostly by fanning the flames of divisive debates already raging in the country. There is bipartisan concern that the constant tearing of America’s political fabric provides an **opening for Russia**, or any other hostile power, to exploit. “It’s just so easy in today’s polarized environment to take advantage of the biases that people have, and their addiction to social media, and their seeking out information that confirms their preconceived views,” said former Rep. Jason Altmire (D-Pa.). Altmire, who served three terms in Congress, recently authorized a book on political polarization, called "Dead Center: How Political Polarization Divided America and What We Can Do about It." Former New Jersey Gov. Christine Todd Whitman, a centrist Republican, expressed a similar view of the threat. “We can’t accept doing nothing — just shrugging our shoulders,” Whitman told The Hill. She said there’s a need to provide states and localities with funding and training to help them identify and rebuff efforts to meddle in elections. But she acknowledged that the broader shift toward the political extremes would be difficult to counteract, especially when the media has become so fractured. “There is no Walter Cronkite anymore,” Whitman said, referring to the legendary CBS News anchorman whose word carried weight with Americans of all political persuasions during his prime in the 1960s and 1970s. Foreign policy specialists have also sounded the alarm. In a New York Times op-ed last month, former President Obama’s national security adviser Susan Rice argued that “the most significant, long-term threat to our security may be our domestic political polarization.” Rice added, “We need to decide whether we want to remain the world’s pre-eminent power — a strong, cohesive beacon of democracy — or if we are content to allow our national autoimmune disorder, like a flesh-eating disease, to devour our body politic.” Skeptics of the Russia story have noted that there is nothing particularly new or unusual about attempts by Moscow, or by other adversaries, to try to affect public opinion in the United States — just as Washington has meddled in other nation’s affairs for decades. But experts in the area argue that the difference now is that the depth of America's divide makes such attacks more effective. John Sipher spent 28 years in the CIA’s National Clandestine Service. He told The Hill that the Kremlin had been seeking to influence American public opinion “for 70, 80 years.” But, he added, two factors make today’s landscape more fertile ground for such efforts. One, he said, was the way in which “the ability to weaponize information via social media has changed.” In addition he said, “the big problem is us. Our hyperpartisanship and our tribal behavior are dry tinder for the Russians.” The recent indictments make clear the extent to which Russians apparently sought to inflame divisions. Prosecutors allege that they sought to capitalize on racial and religious tensions, backed left-wing Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) as well as President Trump in the 2016 campaign, falsely suggested Hillary Clinton harbored sympathies for Sharia law, and even promoted competing pro- and anti-Trump rallies following the 2016 election. Efforts to fuel the flames of American enmity are allegedly ongoing.

#### Breakups and competition create safeguards against it

Hendrickson and Galston, 17 (Clara Hendrickson and William A. Galston, Hendrickson is a Research Analyst - The Brookings Institution, Galston holds the Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in the Brookings Institution’s Governance Studies Program, where he serves as a Senior Fellow. Former Acting Dean at the School of Public Policy, University of Maryland., 12-6-2017, accessed on 8-11-2021, Brookings, "Big technology firms challenge traditional assumptions about antitrust enforcement", <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2017/12/06/big-technology-firms-challenge-traditional-assumptions-about-antitrust-enforcement/>)//Babcii

THE NEW TECHNOLOGY TRUSTS So while fear that big tech can wield excessive influence in our democracy may reflect broader misgivings outside the realm of antitrust law and enforcement, some political concerns about big tech appropriately fall under the purview of antitrust regulation. As Sally Hubbard, a Senior Editor at the Capitol Forum who covers monopolization issues, recently stated in an interview with Vox’s Sean Illing, “Companies like Facebook and Google have had an outsize effect on political discourse because of the ways their algorithms help to promote and spread fake news and propaganda. Even if it’s not their intent, their business model invariably contributes to this problem.” More competition between rival platforms would have introduced a greater number of algorithms for Russian operatives to navigate, and probably would have mitigated the impact of the fake news that successfully targeted voters during the 2016 U.S. election. Similarly, because the services offered by the likes of Google and Facebook are free (or low cost in the case of Amazon), tech companies have escaped the predatory pricing concerns typically triggered by anticompetitive high prices. However, Financial Times columnist Rana Foroohar has argued that we incur non-monetary costs when we use these services, handing over our attention and personal data. Of course these two examples do not immediately elicit a clear solution for antitrust enforcement reform one way or the other, but they do illustrate that the dynamics of the tech era will require an updated conception and application of current antitrust law. While what this looks like remains unclear, a consensus is emerging that the Chicago School consumer welfare framework, formulated by Robert Bork and Richard Posner among others, has failed to capture today’s market power. In a widely-read [note](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/note/amazons-antitrust-paradox) published in the Yale Law Journal, Lina Khan, a fellow at the Open Markets Institute, shows that the focus on low prices as the exclusive goal of antitrust cannot account for Amazon’s dominance.

#### Second---Foreign Policy---Division undermines credible commitments

Trubowitz, 19 (Peter Trubowitz, Professor of international relations at the London School of economics and political science, 5-16-2019, accessed on 8-11-2021, Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank, "Will Dysfunctional Politics Finally End the American Century?", https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/will-dysfunctional-politics-finally-end-american-century#)//Babcii

America is suffering from a shortage of functional or ‘usable power.’ While relative power as measured by its military arsenal vis-à-vis those of its rivals has held steady, the domestic political ability of US presidents to turn the country’s tremendous power and wealth into international influence is declining. This has been the case for some time now. America’s deficit of usable power did not begin with Donald Trump, but it has grown measurably on his watch as president. Presidents’ usable power depends on their ability to win the support of a broad cross-section of the voting public for their foreign policy agenda. Historically, presidents have relied on three tools to gain public buy-in: bipartisanship on Capitol Hill, the leader’s ability to set the terms of debate and the design of economically inclusive policies. Each contributed mightily to the public consensus underpinning US foreign policy for decades after the Second World War. Today, all three are in short supply. Bipartisanship was the norm in foreign policymaking during the Cold War. Democratic presidents could count on the support of moderate eastern Republicans in Congress; Republican presidents relied on the support of conservative southern Democrats. Domestic voters, who worried about presidents’ partisan motives, found such bipartisan support reassuring. So did America’s allies and friends overseas. They worried that in the absence of bipartisan support, international commitments taken by one president would be reversed or soft-pedaled when the party out of power gained control of the White House. This is exactly what has happened since the end of the Cold War. Foreign policymaking has become increasingly partisan and erratic. Incoming presidents now look for opportunities to undo their predecessors’ legacies, something that rarely happened during the Cold War. George W Bush withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and opposed the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court. Barack Obama ended US involvement in Iraq. Donald Trump withdrew the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, pulled out of the Paris Agreement on climate change and renounced the Iran nuclear deal. US relative power may not have changed much since the 1990s, but these examples show decline in America’s willingness to engage and commit internationally as well as in how credible others view its international pronouncements. If hyper-partisanship has made US commitments worth less internationally, the absence of a shared vision of America’s international purpose has made bipartisanship harder to produce domestically. To build lasting bipartisan coalitions, presidents must structure the national conversation in ways that convince voters that their administration’s preferred international policies will strengthen national security and increase economic opportunity while making it hard for their political opponents to mount an effective challenge.

#### Undermined foreign policy and interference culminates in primacy collapse and Russian nuclear war

Trenin, 18 (Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, chairs the research council and the Foreign and Security Policy Program, 1-25-2018, accessed on 8-11-2021, Carnegie Moscow Center, "Avoiding U.S.-Russia Military Escalation During the Hybrid War", http://carnegie.ru/2018/01/25/avoiding-u.s.-russia-military-escalation-during-hybrid-war-pub-75277)

. The war is being fought simultaneously in a number of spheres, on different levels, and in the never-ending, twenty-four-hour news cycle. This aspect of warfare is particularly true of the field of information, which is of prime importance in the Information Age that emerged with the end of the Cold War. From cyber conflicts and the use of artificial intelligence to the predominance of propaganda and fake news, the main battles of the Hybrid War are taking place outside of the purely physical realm and in the domain of new information technologies. Just as important to the Hybrid War is economics, which has been the key driver of globalization that paralleled the rise of these innovative information technologies. The prominence of the U.S. media and the United States’ immense financial power give it a huge advantage in both fields. As a result, the weapons of choice in the Hybrid War are those that use information and economic power to discredit and sanction one’s adversaries.3 Politically, the Hybrid War includes the outside stimulation of political changes in other countries through street activism and the promotion of specific values, parties, or popular movements. It has been characterized by interference in elections, political transitions, and other political processes, including various efforts to hack sensitive information, spread compromising or damaging materials and fake news, encourage character assassinations, and impose personal and other noneconomic sanctions (for example, restrictions on travel, seizure of assets, imprisonment, or deportation) on opponents. The existence of a common information space makes waging political warfare on foreign territory much easier and more attractive than ever before. Cross-border promotion of democracy and support for the color revolutions that dominated the 2000s (for example, the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine) have now found counterparts in emerging solidarity among those who espouse more conservative and traditionalist values, such as political systems based on authoritarian models and strict national sovereignty.4 Military power is not out of the picture—though its use is different than in the Cold War. The static standoff of million-strong armies in Europe and the long shadow of the nuclear arms race have drawn down or faded. Nuclear deterrence between Russia and the West remains in place but at lower and more stable levels than during the Cold War. Today’s risks of miscalculation derive from potential incidents involving conventional forces. A token military standoff has reemerged along Russia’s border with NATO countries, but, to date, this standoff bears no resemblance in either scale or scope to the forces that faced each other during the Cold War. The main focus is on developing new military technologies and novel means and ways of prosecuting warfare—from outer space to cyberspace—that blur or eliminate the distinction between wartime and peacetime. Like its predecessor, the Hybrid War is a war in the time of peace. Even more than in the past, however, the onus is on national leaderships to minimize the number of casualties, ideally to zero. Russian military strategists had developed the concept of hybrid warfare even before the actual conflict broke out in earnest between the United States and Russia in early 2014. Analyzing the experience of the post-Soviet color revolutions and the 2011 Arab Spring, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov wrote in February 2013 that the “consequences of new conflicts are comparable to those of a real war”; in many cases, nonmilitary methods “are substantially more effective than the power of arms,” and greater emphasis is placed on “political, economic, information, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary means” and “covert military measures,” including “information warfare and actions by special forces.” In this environment, “overt use of military force, often in the form of peacekeeping or crisis management, takes place only at a certain stage, mainly to achieve final success in a conflict.” With regard to the U.S.-Russia confrontation, another key feature has surfaced: asymmetry between the sides’ capabilities. POWER ASYMMETRIES AND ASYMMETRIC ACTIONS Although Gerasimov was referring to a hybrid war when discussing new means and methods of warfare, this analysis uses the newly fashionable term to describe the current U.S.-Russia confrontation. Unlike its Cold War predecessor, this conflict is asymmetrical. At least since the 1970s, the Soviet Union was the United States’ equal in terms of both nuclear and conventional military power. Even beyond its own vast land mass and immediate sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, it wielded considerable ideological power in many Western countries and in the Third World and presided over a system of alliances in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. The Russian Federation, by contrast, has few formal allies, no satellite states, and a handful of protectorates, if one includes the self-proclaimed states of Abkhazia, Donbass, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. It has no ideology to compare with the comprehensive dogma of Marxism-Leninism, and although it is still a nuclear superpower, it lags far behind the United States in non-nuclear military capabilities. Economically, Russia—with its estimated 1.5 percent of the global gross domestic product—is a dwarf. Neither the balance nor the correlation of forces, however, will determine the outcome of this confrontation. Despite the glaring asymmetries in the national power of the two sides of the conflict, the course of events is not predetermined. As a nonlinear, highly asymmetrical conflict, the outcome likely will result from domestic developments in Russia or the United States or both. Both countries are facing serious problems that could prove decisive in the final calculations of the Hybrid War. The United States is going through a triple crisis of its political system, exemplified but not caused by the arrival of President Donald Trump and the virulent domestic opposition to him and his policies. A crisis of social values lies beneath this political crisis and points to a widening gap between the more liberal and the largely conservative parts of the country. At the same time, the United States faces a crisis within its own foreign policy as it struggles to reconcile the conflict between the more inward-looking U.S. national interest and the international liberal order of the U.S.-led global system. Russia, though outwardly stable, is approaching its own major crisis as the political regime created by Putin faces an uncertain future after the eventual departure of its figurehead. Putin’s Kremlin is already working on a political transition that would rejuvenate the elite and improve its competence and performance, but, at the same time, Russian society is also changing and Putin’s heirs cannot take its support for granted. Gross inequality, sluggish economic growth, low vertical mobility, and high-level corruption will present a range of serious challenges to the future Russian leadership. The eventual outcome of the Hybrid War could be reminiscent of the downfall of the Soviet Union, which was far less the result of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War than of a misguided effort to reform the Soviet Union itself. Russia might break down and break up again, or it might decide on a foreign policy more geared toward its economic needs than to a certain concept of world order. As for the United States, it might decide to limit its global commitments and redesign its international role as the world’s preeminent but no longer dominant state. Yet, in doing so, it will need to accept that its change in status will come with a certain price and that it will not be able to take advantage of the benefits of the position it once enjoyed. Asymmetries in power lead to asymmetric actions, which as Gerasimov suggested are intended to “neutralize the enemy’s superiority in warfare” or “identify and exploit the enemy’s vulnerabilities.”5 By an order of magnitude—or more—Russia is outgunned, outmanned, and outspent by the combined forces of the United States and its allies. To stay in the fight, it must rely on its few comparative advantages and seek to use them to maximum effect. These advantages include the geographical proximity of some of the main theaters of operation, such as Crimea and eastern Ukraine, where Russia has escalation dominance; the Russian political system, which allows for secretive, swift, and decisive action; and Moscow’s willingness to take much higher risks in view of the disproportionally higher stakes involved for the Russian leadership and a national culture that historically has tolerated higher losses in defense or protection of the Motherland. Through swift decisions and actions, made without prior warning, Russia is capable of surprising its adversaries and keeping them off-balance. This situation promises an uncertain, hard-to-predict, and risky environment, where miscalculation can lead to incidents or collisions that, in turn, lead to escalation. Granted, these incidents would be of a different kind than the tank standoff at Berlin’s Checkpoint Charlie in late October 1961 or the Cuban Missile Crisis barely a year later. Escalation resulting from miscalculation would not be automatic, but the wider damage it could cause needs to be taken seriously. AVOIDING MISTAKES LEADING TO ESCALATION The Hybrid War is highly dynamic and, so far, has no agreed-upon rules. In this sense, it resembles the Cold War of the early 1950s rather than that of the 1970s. However, it is possible, up to a point, to avoid military escalation during the Hybrid War. U.S.-Russian antagonism does not mean that the two countries’ interests are in total opposition. Unlike in the second half of the twentieth century, neither party envisions a real shooting war against its adversary and neither wants to allow the situation to become uncontrollable. The most obvious ways to manage the confrontation are incident prevention, confidence building, and arms control. Incident prevention, on the face of it, should be easy. Since the early 1970s, Moscow and Washington have had agreements in place to avoid incidents, which in the Cold War days carried the risk of escalation to nuclear levels. Effective prevention requires a degree of professionalism, adequate safety measures, and reliable channels of communications. However, during a Hybrid War, these preconditions cannot be taken for granted. Acting from a position of relative weakness, Russia is likely to compensate for its inferior overall strength by raising the stakes of confrontation.

#### Plus nuclear proliferation and probing --- Extinction

Montgomery, 16 (EVAN BRADEN Montgomery, Evan Braden Montgomery is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Dr.Montgomery graduated summa cum laude from Villanova University with a B.A. in Political Scienceand Sociology, and received his M.A. and Ph.D. in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia., 2016, accessed on 7-23-2021, Csba, "EXTENDED DETERRENCEIN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE ", https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA6183-ExtendedDeterrence\_PRINT.pdf)//Babcii

Extended deterrence can help the United States uphold the status quo in several ways. Specifically, it can discourage revisionist powers from provoking crises or launching wars because there is a high probability that Washington will intervene to deny their aims and punish them for acts of aggression; it can dissuade friendly nations from developing controversial military capabilities that might heighten local tensions or trigger regional conflicts because those nations can rely on the United States instead; and it can offer a source of leverage over security partners, one that helps the United States to discourage other courses of action that might prove destabilizing and encourage positive steps on a variety of issues. Despite its importance, extended deterrence is one of the most challenging aspects of American strategy. While persuading adversaries that the United States would retaliate for a direct attack is relatively easy, convincing them that it would retaliate for an attack against other nations is a much more difficult proposition. Furthermore, convincing allies that the United States will actually fight on their behalf—even if that means putting its own troops and territory at risk—can be even harder.4 As Thomas Schelling famously wrote, when it comes to deterrence, “The difference between the national homeland and everything ‘abroad’ is the difference between threats that are inherently credible, even if unspoken, and the threats that have to be made credible.”5 Not surprisingly, efforts to make extended deterrence credible in the eyes of adversaries and allies alike have shaped virtually every aspect of American military power. For instance, the United States has adhered to a conventional military strategy that emphasizes countering threats when and where they emerge rather than depending on local nations to prevent aggression or roll back expansion; it has fielded combined-arms forces capable of resisting distant rivals, even those with quantitative advantages in men and materiel; and it has built a global network of military bases to deploy, operate, and sustain those forces overseas.6 Finally, but equally important, it has relied on its nuclear arsenal for the purpose of extending deterrence to its allies and partners.7 Throughout the Cold War, strategic nuclear weapons provided Washington with the capacity to conduct a devastating reprisal against the Soviet Union if Moscow ever launched a nuclear strike against the U.S. homeland or the Red Army attempted to overrun Europe. At the same time, theater and battlefield nuclear weapons, many of which were permanently stationed on allied territory, could be used to blunt an offensive by numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces if NATO’s conventional units were not up to the task.8 These weapons were also used to “couple” the United States to its vulnerable frontline partners, who had doubts that Washington would truly employ its strategic nuclear forces on their behalf. By raising the prospect of early nuclear use against Soviet troops and territory, the presence of non-strategic weapons signaled a U.S. willingness to escalate in defense of its allies rather than withdrawal to North America in the face of a successful Soviet invasion.9 Over the past twenty-five years, however, many of the extended deterrence dilemmas that occupied U.S. policymakers in the past—especially the dilemmas associated with extended nuclear deterrence—ceased to be a major source of concern. With Russia in decline and China focused on sustaining its economic rise, treaty allies in Europe and Asia have been relatively safe from serious threats. Meanwhile, as the world’s sole superpower, the United States has enjoyed enormous military advantages over potential rivals and has been able to rely on its conventional forces to discourage aggression. This favorable situation appears to be changing, though, putting extended nuclear deterrence back on the agenda. For example, although the unipolar moment appeared to herald the waning of geopolitics and the end of major power security competitions, at least according to some observers, revisionist actors are once again challenging the status quo in multiple regions.10 Russia’s invasion of Georgia, annexation of Crimea, and support for rebel groups in eastern Ukraine all indicate that Moscow does not respect the political order of post-Cold War Europe. At the same time, China’s conventional military buildup has shifted the balance of power in Asia, while its “creeping expansion” in the South China Sea could enable Beijing to assert greater control over one of the world’s most vital waterways. And despite the recent agreement to constrain its nuclear program, Iran continues to build offensive missile forces and support violent extremist groups. In short, Russia’s piecemeal efforts to restore its lost continental empire, China’s military expansion in its near seas and beyond, and Iran’s willingness to both create and fill power vacuums throughout its neighborhood all suggest that “geopolitical rivalries have stormed back to center stage.”11 Compounding this trend, the world is now in the midst of what many analysts refer to as a “second nuclear age,” one that is arguably more complex and potentially more volatile than the bipolar U.S.–Soviet struggle that characterized the Cold War.12 Not only does the United States still need to worry about maintaining strategic stability with a nuclear peer, albeit one possessing far fewer weapons than it did in the past, but it must also manage a number of other existing and emerging challenges: the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems to fragile nations, the expansion of nuclear arsenals by minor powers and aspiring major powers, and the pursuit of capabilities that are lowering the barriers to nuclear use and eroding the “firebreak” between conventional and nuclear conflict.13

#### End of unipolarity causes global escalation --- Only unipolarity can explain post WWII peace

Michael Beckley 18. Professor of political science at Tufts. *Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower*. Cornell University Press.

The story of world politics is often told as a game of thrones in which a rotating cast of great powers battles for top-dog status. According to researchers led by Graham Allison at Harvard, there have been sixteen cases in the past ﬁve hundred years when a rising power challenged a ruling power. 3 Twelve of these cases ended in carnage. One can quibble with Allison’s case selection, but the basic pattern is clear: hegemonic rivalry has sparked a catastrophic war every forty years on average for the past half millennium.

The emergence of unipolarity in 1991 has put this cycle of hegemonic competition on hold. Obviously wars and security competition still occur in today’s unipolar world—in fact, as I explain later, unipolarity has made certain types of asymmetric conﬂict more likely—but none of these conﬂicts have the global scope or generational length of a hegemonic rivalry.

To appreciate this point, just consider the Cold War—one of the four “peaceful” cases of hegemonic rivalry identiﬁed by Allison’s study. Although the two superpowers never went to war, they divided the world into rival camps, waged proxy wars that killed millions of people, and pushed each other to the brink of nuclear Armageddon. For forty-ﬁve years, World War III and human extinction were nontrivial possibilities.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, by contrast, the United States has not faced a hegemonic rival, and the world, though far from perfect, has been more peaceful and prosperous than ever before.

Just look at the numbers. From 1400 to 1991, the rate of war deaths worldwide hovered between 5 and 10 deaths per 100,000 people and spiked to 200 deaths per 100,000 during major wars. 4 After 1991, however, war death rates dropped to 0.5 deaths per 100,000 people and have stayed there ever since. Interstate wars have disappeared almost entirely, and the number of civil wars has declined by more than 30 percent. 5 Meanwhile, the global economy has quadrupled in size, creating more wealth between 1991 and 2018 than in all prior human history combined. 6

What explains this unprecedented outbreak of peace and prosperity? Some scholars attribute it to advances in communications technology, from the printing press to the telegraph to the Internet, which supposedly spread empathy around the globe and caused entire nations to place a higher value on human life. 7

Such explanations are appealing, because they play on our natural desire to believe in human progress, but are they convincing? Did humans suddenly become 10 to 20 times less violent and cruel in 1991? Are we orders of magnitude more noble and kind than our grandparents? Has social media made us more empathetic? Of course not, which is why the dramatic decline in warfare after 1991 is better explained by geopolitics than sociology. 8

The collapse of the Soviet Union not only ended the Cold War and related proxy ﬁghting, it also opened up large swathes of the world to democracy, international commerce, and peacekeeping forces—all of which surged after 1991 and further dampened conﬂict. 9 Faced with overwhelming U.S. economic and military might, most countries have decided to work within the American-led liberal order rather than ﬁght to overturn it. 10 As of 2018, nearly seventy countries have joined the U.S. alliance network—a Kantian community in which war is unthinkable—and even the two main challengers to this community, China and Russia, begrudgingly participate in the institutions of the liberal order (e.g., the UN, the WTO, the IMF, World Bank, and the G-20), engage in commerce with the United States and its allies, and contribute to international peacekeeping missions. 11 History may not have ended in 1991, but it clearly changed in profound ways—and mostly for the better.

#### Unipolarity solves interventions by providing the US with the freedom of action to avoid ill-advised fights. BUT retrenchment causes prolif of proxy conflicts and adventurism.

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Systemic Dimensions: The Varying Prevalence of Competitive Intervention The framework articulated above not only provides a comprehensive account of the duration effects of competitive intervention on civil wars—it also highlights a candidate explanation for the recent decline in the prevalence of intrastate conflict. Insofar as state decisions to aid combatants are consistent with competitive state policy-making, temporal variation in geopolitical competition between states should affect trends in the prevalence of competitive intervention. Variation in the prevalence of competitive intervention should in turn affect temporal trends in the prevalence of internal conflict through the duration effects described above. Consider the pervasiveness of US-Soviet competition during the Cold War. Bipolarity extended the geographic scope of concern and broadened the range of factors included in the competition between the superpowers. American and Soviet leaders worried that challenges to the existing distribution of power might raise doubts about the credibility of their alliance commitments, thereby encouraging their allies to drift toward neutrality or, worse still, switch sides (Hironaka 2005, 107–11). Because challenges to the status quo were perceived to threaten the relative balance of power and credibility, they were resisted. Yet, because any action by one superpower was perceived as an attempt to gain a geostrategic advantage, it demanded a response. The end result was a proliferation of US-Soviet competitive intervention, wherein the superpowers committed resources to opposing government and rebel forces fighting on the periphery of their spheres of influence. That many civil wars during the Cold War were superpower proxy wars is a well-rehearsed perspective, but what is missing from existing accounts is an explanation for why superpower sponsorship should be associated with longer conflicts. If foreign civil wars played such a key role in the larger Cold War struggle, why did the superpowers not do what was necessary to help their respective sides win? The theory outlined above provides an answer: challenges to the relative balance of power and credibility necessitated reflexive responses, but the impossible stakes of direct confrontation advised caution. While the superpowers were compelled to intervene, they were simultaneously—and paradoxically—compelled to do so with restraint. Superpower rivalry also had secondary duration effects. Constrained by the need to both deter and avoid direct confrontation, Washington and Moscow employed indirect strategies for projecting power. Military aid was an integral element of their competition for influence, and accordingly, money and weapons diffused not only to civil wars, but across the international system. This assistance empowered client states, providing a set of Cold War framings and superpower arms that could be used to justify and implement independent foreign policy objectives. Notably, the superpowers struggled to control their clients’ adventurism; by exploiting fears of defection to the opposing bloc, clients found ways to commandeer superpower aid for their own self-interested ends (Krause 1991). The net result was a proliferation of interventions by otherwise weak states in civil wars across the globe. In the post–Cold War period, by contrast, state clients have a harder time garnering American aid. Regional powers continue to intervene in civil wars, but they can no longer rely on the reflexive support of the USSR when conflicts of interest arise vis-à-vis US policy, nor can they threaten defection to the Soviet-bloc in the face of American sanction. In the unipolar period, the United States has greater choice in which state clients it chooses to support, enjoys greater flexibility to discipline adventurism by weaker powers, and maintains “command of the commons” to restrict flows of economic and military aid around the globe (Posen 2003). Together, these features of the unipolar system constrain foreign adventurism by lesser powers relative to the Cold War period, thereby reducing—though not eliminating—the prevalence of competitive interventions among neighboring states and regional rivals. In this way, the transition from a bipolar to unipolar system not only terminated superpower proxy warfare, but also decreased the rate of competitive intervention by lesser powers.

#### Nuanced debates are essential to lock in the grand strategy --- Only engagement convinces the public to look past shallow indictments in favor of the benefits of primacy

**Brands 18** [Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments." American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump." Page 21-23]

Fifth and finally, sustaining America’s post–Cold War strategy entails persuading the American public to recommit to that strategy and the investments it requires. The state of American opinion on that subject is currently ambiguous. Polling data indicates that public support for most key aspects of American internationalism has recovered somewhat from where it was in 2012–13, and is again at or near postwar averages.32 But the 2016 election cycle and its eventual outcome revealed strong support for candidates who advocated rolling back key elements of post–Cold War (and post–World War II) grand strategy, from free trade to U.S. alliances. This atmosphere reflects discontent with the failures and frustrations of U.S. grand strategy in the post–Cold War era, no doubt, yet it also reflects the fact that American strategy seems **at risk of becoming a victim of its own success**.33 By helping to foster a comparatively stable and congenial environment, American policies have made it more difficult for Americans to remember why significant investments in the global order are needed in the first place.

Today, this ambivalence is becoming increasingly problematic, for the simple reason that properly resourcing American strategy requires making politically difficult trade-offs with respect to entitlements and other ballooning domestic costs. It is also becoming problematic, of course, because even if the American public seems to support particular aspects of American grand strategy, the public has shown itself willing to elect a president who appears to care little for the successful postwar and post–Cold War tradition, even if he has, so far, maintained more aspects of that tradition as president than his campaign rhetoric might have led one to expect. In the future—and indeed, looking beyond Trump’s presidency— sustaining American grand strategy will thus require more intensive political efforts.

American leaders will need to more effectively make the case for controversial but broadly beneficial policies such as free trade, while also addressing the inevitable socioeconomic dislocations such policies cause.34 They will need to more fully articulate the underlying logic and value of alliances and other commitments whose costs are often more visible—not to say greater—than their benefits. They will need to remind Americans that their country’s leadership has not been a matter of charity; it has helped produce an international order that is exceptional in its stability, liberalism, and benefits for the United States. Not least, they will need to make the case that the costs that the country has borne in support of that order are designed to avoid the necessity of bearing vastly higher costs if the international scene returned to a more tumultuous state. After all, the success of American statecraft is often reflected in the bad things that don’t happen as well as in the good things that do. Making this point is essential to reconsolidating domestic support now and in the future—and to preserving a grand strategy that has delivered pretty good results for a quarter century.

#### Even a regional war causes nuclear winter --- guarantees extinction

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Nuclear warfare could have devastating impacts on millions of people, yet it has been suggested that regional or global nuclear conflict may be possible in the future (Toon et al., 2019). In addition to the calamitous impacts of nuclear conflict on a local level, research conducted with a range of climate models finds a global cooling in response to various conflict scenarios (Coupe et al., 2019; Malone et al., 1985; Mills et al., 2014; Pausata et al., 2016; Robock et al., 2007; Turco et al., 1983). This global cooling is driven by fires started by the nuclear weapons. These fires inject smoke into the upper troposphere, where rapid lofting can spread the sunlight-absorbing soot particles into the stratosphere (Turco et al., 1983). Recent research implies that even a small nuclear conflict may have impacts on the global climate system, affecting the state and circulation of the atmosphere (Robock et al., 2007), increasing the sea ice extent in both hemispheres (Mills et al., 2014), and reducing plant productivity and crop yields in regions far from the conflict location (Özdogan et al., ˘ 2013; Toon et al., 2019; Xia & Robock, 2013). While less studied, the potential impacts of nuclear conflict on the ocean are many. Numerous physical, chemical, and biological processes in the ocean are temperature dependent, and sunlight is a critical ingredient for photosynthesizing phytoplankton at the base of the marine food web. Using a climate model with an interactive ocean, Mills et al. (2014) evaluated the ocean physical response to a potential India/Pakistan nuclear war that lofts 5 Tg of black carbon particles into the stratosphere; they find a 0.8◦ C decrease in globally averaged sea surface temperature, with smaller temperature reductions at depth. Recently Toon et al. (2019) used an Earth system model that includes a representation for phytoplankton to evaluate the ocean biological response to nuclear conflict; they report a 5–15% decrease in phytoplankton productivity under a range of conflict scenarios. Such findings prompt further investigation into how nuclear conflict and the resulting global cooling may alter the chemical state of the ocean. Perturbations in the ocean's carbonate chemistry are of particular interest, owing to their importance for ocean acidification. Ocean acidification is an ongoing, large-scale environmental problem driven by fossil fuel emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2). Cumulatively since the preindustrial era, the ocean has absorbed 41% of the carbon emitted by human industrial activities (McKinley et al., 2017). While this ocean absorption of carbon has partially mitigated anthropogenic global warming, it has fundamentally altered the carbonate chemistry of the ocean, increasing the concentration of hydrogen ions ([H+]) while decreasing the concentration of carbonate ions ([CO2− 3 ]). Observations collected at time series sites across the global ocean find statistically significant reductions in the potential hydrogen (pH = −log([H+])) and the saturation state of the calcium carbonate mineral aragonite (Ωarag, which is proportional to [CO2− 3 ]) over the past few decades (Bates et al., 2014). These changes are a direct consequence of the ocean absorption of anthropogenic carbon; carbonate chemistry dictates that the excess carbon will react with water and CO2− 3 to decrease ocean pH and Ω (Feely et al., 2004). Both of these changes may have negative consequences for marine organisms, in particular for those that precipitate calcium carbonate shells (e.g., coccolithophores, pteropods, foraminifera, corals, molluscs, and echinoderms), as the precipitation is hindered by low pH, and because decreases in Ω favor shell dissolution (Doney et al., 2009). To date, there have been no studies of the effects of nuclear conflict on ocean acidification, though past modeling studies on the ocean's response to volcanic forcing and to proposed geoengineering schemes have intimated that ocean carbonate chemistry is highly sensitive to these types of external forcings. Using a fully coupled carbon-climate model, Frölicher et al. (2011) find that volcanic-induced cooling following the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption led to immediate increases in the flux of carbon from atmosphere to ocean and consequently, increases in the total dissolved inorganic carbon (DIC) concentration in the surface ocean. Eddebbar et al. (2019) demonstrate that air-to-sea CO2 fluxes are significantly enhanced following the eruptions of Agung, El Chichón, and Pinatubo in a large ensemble of simulations with an Earth system model. Matthews et al. (2009) conduct solar radiation management climate engineering simulations with an intermediate complexity model of the coupled climate-carbon system; they find changes in ocean pH and Ωarag as a result of the anomalous cooling. Similarly, Lauvset et al. (2017) indicate that radiation management geoengineering leads to changes in North Atlantic pH in a fully coupled Earth system model, but they do not explore changes in Ωarag. While these studies are suggestive of the carbonate chemistry response to nuclear conflict, the external forcing perturbations are of a different magnitude and duration than those imposed by nuclear conflict. Further, it is difficult to mechanistically understand the ocean carbonate chemistry response to such external forcing perturbations in fully coupled models, where the terrestrial response to forcing additionally influences the atmospheric CO2 concentration. Here, we use a state-of-the art Earth system model to simulate the ocean carbonate chemistry response to a range of nuclear conflict scenarios. We decouple the ocean carbon cycle from that of the terrestrial carbon cycle via a direct prescription of the atmospheric CO2 boundary condition used for air-sea CO2 flux, that is, changes in the terrestrial biosphere have no influence on the atmospheric CO2 that the ocean sees. As we will demonstrate, we find large perturbations in ocean pH and Ωarag as a result of nuclear conflict. These perturbations have relatively long duration (order of 10 years) and are driven by decreases in temperature and subsequent increases in the ocean carbon inventory. 2. Methods We analyse output generated by the Community Earth System Model (CESM) version 1.3, a state-of-the-art coupled climate model consisting of atmosphere, ocean, land, and sea ice components (Hurrell et al., 2013). The atmosphere component of CESM in our simulations is the Whole Atmosphere Community Climate Model (WACCM; Marsh et al., 2013) with nominal 2◦ resolution, 66 vertical levels, and a model top at ∼145 km; it uses the Rapid Radiative Transfer Model for GCMs (RRTMG; Iacono et al., 2000) for the radiative transfer. The Community Aerosol and Radiation Model for Atmospheres (Bardeen et al., 2008) is coupled with WACCM to simulate the injection, lofting, advection, and removal of soot aerosols in the troposphere and stratosphere, and their subsequent impact on climate (Coupe et al., 2019; Toon et al., 2019). The ocean component of CESM is the Parallel Ocean Program version 2 (Danabasoglu et al., 2012) with nominal 1◦ resolution and 60 vertical levels. The biogeochemical ocean component of CESM is the Biogeochemical Elemental Cycling model that represents the lower trophic levels of the marine ecosystem, full carbonate system thermodynamics, air-sea CO2 fluxes, and a dynamic iron cycle (Doney et al., 2006; Moore et al., 2004, 2013; Moore & Braucher, 2008; Long et al., 2013; Lindsay et al., 2014). LOVENDUSKI ET AL. 2 of 9 Geophysical Research Letters 10.1029/2019GL086246 The ocean in the coupled CESM simulation is initialized from rest with World Ocean Circulation (WOCE) temperature and salinity (Gouretski & Koltermann, 2004). Biogeochemical tracers are initialized to observationally based climatologies where possible (Lauvset et al., 2016); where these were not available (such as dissolved iron and phytoplankton biomass), the model is initialized with fields interpolated from an existing CESM simulation. The new, fully coupled simulation was spun up for 4 years to an approximate steady state with a constant atmospheric CO2 mixing ratio of 370 ppm, representative of the mixing ratio in the year 2000. Due to the relatively short spin-up period, the globally integrated air-sea CO2 flux is not in steady state (drifting at a rate of 0.14 Pg C year−2) when the perturbation forcing is applied. We therefore present our results as anomalies from the drifting control integrations. Three control simulations of 20-year duration are generated using round-off level differences in atmospheric initial conditions. As each of these control simulations has different phasing of internal variability (e.g., El Niño-Southern Oscillation), we use the standard deviation across this ensemble to identify statistically significant perturbations due to nuclear conflict. We report on the anomalies generated from four simulations of nuclear conflict with varying amounts of soot injection: three India/Pakistan conflict scenarios that inject 5, 27, and 47 Tg of soot, respectively, and one US/Russia conflict scenario that injects 150 Tg of soot. The initial soot injection amounts are generated from plausible scenarios for nuclear conflict following advice from a number of military and policy experts; the reader is referred to Toon et al. (2019) for further details on scenario development. In each case, we prescribe that the conflict begins on 15 May of the 5th year of the first control simulation, and we integrate the model for a 15-year period following the injection. We assume that the smoke generated by mass fires from nuclear conflict is injected into the upper troposphere above the target sites (in the U. S./Russia case, smoke is spread evenly over the two nations), as in Toon et al. (2019). WACCM lofts much of this smoke higher into the stratosphere via solar heating of black carbon aerosols in the smoke, where the black carbon aerosols persist for about a decade. The resulting annual mean, post-conflict (May to the following April) anomalies in aerosol optical depth are shown in Figure 1a. These optical depth changes result in a 10–40% reduction in incoming solar energy (Toon et al., 2019). While we discuss the anomalies generated from all four of these conflict simulations, we describe two in greater detail throughout this manuscript: the U. S./Russia case, as it is the largest climate perturbation overall, and the India/Pakistan 47-Tg case, as it is the largest climate perturbation generated by a regional nuclear conflict. Ocean biogeochemistry in the version of CESM used for our simulations has been extensively validated in the literature (Brady et al., 2019; Freeman et al., 2018; Harrison et al., 2018; Krumhardt et al., 2017; Lindsay et al., 2014; Lovenduski et al., 2015, 2016; Long et al., 2013, 2016; Moore et al., 2013; McKinley et al., 2016; Negrete-García et al., 2019). Of particular note for our study, the simulated surface ocean carbonate ion concentration from a long, preindustrial control simulation of CESM compares favorably with reconstructed observations, albeit with lower interannual variance than has been measured at subtropical time series sites (Lovenduski et al., 2015). In Figure S1 in the supporting information, we illustrate the comparison between observationally based estimates of surface ocean pH and Ωarag (from GLODAPv2; Lauvset et al., 2016) and the CESM control ensemble mean. In this comparison, we note that the observational estimates have been extensively interpolated and are intended to represent year 2002 carbonate chemistry parameters, whereas CESM has been integrated under an atmospheric CO2 mixing ratio that corresponds to year 2000 forcing. We find high correspondence between the spatial patterns of modeled and observed pH and Ωarag, giving us confidence that CESM is capable of representing the mean state of these two variables. 3. Results Globally averaged surface ocean pH increases in response to each of the nuclear conflicts, where the magnitude of the pH anomaly scales with the amount of soot injected (Figure 1b). In each case, the pH anomaly exceeds the interannual standard deviation of pH in the control ensemble mean (gray shading in Figure 1b). We observe the largest increases in surface ocean pH in response to the U. S./Russia 150-Tg case; here the globally averaged surface ocean pH anomaly exceeds 0.05, corresponding to a ∼10% decrease in the global mean hydrogen ion concentration. Under each scenario, the pH anomaly peaks 2–4 years after the conflict and persists for ∼10 years. With the exception of the high-latitude oceans, the pH increase following the nuclear conflict is pervasive across the surface ocean (Figures 2a– 2c). In the 47-Tg India/Pakistan scenario, we observe local pH anomalies exceeding 0.06 units on average in years 2–5 post conflict (Figure 2c); the anomalies are largest in the North Atlantic, North Pacific, and Equatorial Pacific. These large, abrupt changes in surface ocean pH may have important consequences for calcifying organisms, as shell precipitation can be affected by the ambient hydrogen ion concentration in seawater (Kroeker et al., 2013). Since the beginning of the industrial revolution, global ocean pH has dropped by an estimated 0.1 units (Ciais & Sabine, 2013). The anomalies in pH generated by our simulations exceed 50% of this historical change and occur over a much shorter time period. Whether and how organisms respond to the initial and rapid alleviation of low pH, followed by an immediate return to the current pH state in the global ocean, is as yet unknown (see, e.g., Haigh et al., 2015). In contrast to our results for pH, we observe decreases in surface ocean Ωarag following nuclear conflict (Figure 1c), which should tend to inhibit the maintenance of shells and skeletons in calcified organisms. While minimal changes in Ωarag are simulated for the 5-Tg India/Pakistan case, the other three cases produce large decreases in saturation state, on the order of 0.1 to 0.3 units (Figure 1c). In each of these three cases, the anomalies exceed the interannual standard deviation of Ωarag in the control ensemble mean (gray shading in Figure 1c). The peak response in these three cases occurs 3–5 years post conflict, a year or so later than the pH response. While for pH the globally averaged anomaly is negligibly small, 10-years post conflict; anomalies in globally averaged Ωarag persist beyond our 15-year simulation time frame for all conflict scenarios. The decreases in aragonite saturation state span the tropics and subtropics, with the exception of the central and eastern Equatorial Pacific region (Figures 2d– 2f). Local decreases in saturation state exceed 0.5 units in the western North Atlantic and western North Pacific under the 47-Tg India/Pakistan scenario (Figure 2f). Importantly, the simulated decreases in saturation state are highly pronounced in regions that host diverse coral reef ecosystems (for instance, the western and southwestern Pacific and the Caribbean), and like pH, the changes in saturation state occur fairly rapidly. Projections from climate models suggest that coral reef ecosystems across the world will experience aragonite saturation state declines from their preindustrial value of 3.5 to 3.0 by the end of the century (Ricke et al., 2013); alarmingly, our simulations project similar Ωarag declines over a 3- to 5-year period, which then persist for years after the initial forcing dissipates. The opposite-signed anomalies in pH and Ωarag induced by nuclear conflict seem puzzling at first, as for "typical" anthropogenic ocean acidification scenarios, both of these variables simultaneously decrease. Why would nuclear conflict cause opposing responses in pH and saturation state? To understand these opposing responses, we need to consider the carbonate chemistry system in seawater and its sensitivity to changing temperature. Gaseous CO2 reacts with seawater to form carbonic acid (H2CO3), which then dissociates to form H+ and bicarbonate (HCO− 3 ). The hydrogen ion then reacts with CO2− 3 to form additional HCO− 3 , CO2 + H2O− ↽−−−−−−⇀−H2CO3. (1) H2CO3− ↽−−−−−−⇀−H+ + HCO− 3 . (2) H+ + CO2− 3 − ↽−−−−−−⇀−HCO− 3 . (3) The equilibrium constants for these reactions (typically expressed as K0, K1, and K2, respectively; Sarmiento & Gruber, 2006) are sensitive to changes in temperature, for example, the cooling induced by nuclear conflict. We need to also consider the dissolution reaction for mineral calcium carbonate (CaCO3) in seawater, CaCO3(s)− ↽−−−−−−⇀−Ca2+ sat + CO2− 3,sat, (4) where [Ca2+]sat and [CO2− 3 ]sat are the concentrations of dissolved calcium and carbonate in equilibrium with mineral CaCO3, and the solubility product (Ksp) for this reaction is also sensitive to temperature (Sarmiento & Gruber, 2006). Further, the saturation state for a calcium carbonate mineral in seawater (here: aragonite), can be expressed as Ωarag = [Ca2+][CO2− 3 ] Ksp , (5) where both [CO2− 3 ] and Ksp are affected by changes in temperature (Ca2+ is highly abundant in seawater, and thus changes in temperature do not affect its concentration enough to matter for CaCO3 dissolution; Emerson & Hedges, 2008; Sarmiento & Gruber, 2006). Thus, we can decompose the anomalies in pH and Ωarag into the component driven by temperature-induced changes in the carbonate chemistry equilibrium constants (K0, K1, K2, and Ksp) and the component driven by all other changes to the carbonate chemistry system, such as changes in the DIC concentration, the alkalinity, or the salinity. We approximate the temperature sensitivity of the equilibrium constants using a program developed for CO2 system calculations (CO2SYS; van Heuven et al., 2011) via finite difference approximation. The component driven by all other changes to the carbonate system is computed as the residual of the other two terms. The pH response to nuclear conflict is the sum of two opposing drivers: an increase in pH driven by a decrease in sea surface temperature that alters the carbonate chemistry equilibrium constants and a decrease in pH driven by an increase in the DIC concentration of the upper ocean. Figure 1b illustrates the temporal evolution of the components of the global pH anomalies from the India/Pakistan 47-Tg simulation driven by changes in the equilibrium constants versus all other changes in the carbonate chemistry system. The equilibrium constant-driven pH anomaly is positive, peaking 2–3 years after the conflict, whereas the “other” component of the pH anomaly is negative, peaking 3–5 years after the conflict. The resulting total pH anomaly is positive, indicating that it is more strongly influenced by changes in the equilibrium constants than other changes. In the India/Pakistan 47-Tg case, globally averaged temperature reaches a minimum 2 to 3-years post conflict; the model initially produces 3.5◦C–4◦C anomalies at the surface that rewarm toward pre-conflict values for the duration of the simulation (Figure 3a). In contrast, surface ocean salinity-normalized DIC anomalies peak 3 to 5-years post conflict (Figure 3b), mainly as a result of the enhanced solubility of CO2 in colder seawater. While decreasing biological export production also contributes to increased DIC in the surface ocean, this signal is small relative to the change driven by enhanced air-to-sea CO2 flux (e.g., Figure S2). The delay in DIC relative to temperature anomalies is a result of the long (order months to years) timescale for CO2 to fully equilibrate with the surface mixed layer (Emerson & Hedges, 2008). The cold, high DIC surface anomalies slowly propagate into the global ocean thermocline; we observe 1◦ C and 10 mmol m−3 anomalies in temperature and DIC, respectively, at a depth of 300 m that persist beyond the length of our simulation (Figure 3). As there are no significant anomalies in global mean alkalinity or salinity post conflict (not shown), we conclude that the DIC perturbation drives the “other” component of the pH anomalies. We find similar behavior for these components in the other conflict scenarios (not shown). The negative Ωarag anomalies post conflict are driven by a combination of lower temperatures and higher DIC concentrations. Colder surface temperatures tend to increase Ksp, while higher surface DIC concentrations tend to decrease [CO2− 3 ], resulting in lower Ωarag values post conflict. Figure 1c illustrates that the DIC (other) component dominates the total Ωarag anomaly for the India/Pakistan 47-Tg simulation. As for pH, the equilibrium constant component peaks earlier than the other component; this is due to the timing of the temperature and DIC perturbations (Figure 3). The spatial patterns of the post-conflict surface pH and Ωarag anomalies in the India/Pakistan 47-Tg scenario (Figures 2c and 2f) result from perturbations in local surface ocean temperature and DIC (Figure S3). Negative temperature anomalies and positive DIC anomalies are pervasive in the tropics and extratropics, with the exception of the eastern Equatorial Pacific, where a large and long-lasting El Niño-like event develops following the conflict (Coupe, et al., manuscript in review). This strong reduction in the equatorial trade winds greatly weakens upwelling in the cold tongue region, producing near-zero surface temperature anomalies and a reduction in vertical DIC supply here (Figure S3). In the Southern Ocean, temperature and DIC are not much affected by the nuclear conflict, likely a result of enhanced upwelling of warm water from the subsurface (Harrison, et al., manuscript in preparation). Taken together, the aforementioned changes in temperature and DIC lead to increases in pH and decreases in Ωarag over most of the ocean surface (Figure S4). The changes in surface ocean pH that we simulate for nuclear conflict resemble the simulated response of pH to volcanic eruptions, but are an order of magnitude larger. Figure S5 illustrates the anomaly in surface ocean pH in the first year following the eruptions of Agung, El Chichón, and Mt. Pinatubo, as estimated by the CESM Large Ensemble (Kay et al., 2015), which uses the same physical and biogeochemical ocean components as in our nuclear conflict simulations. The ensemble mean isolates the evolution of the Earth system under historical external forcing, including the aerosol loading following volcanic eruptions (Eddebbar et al., 2019), and averages across the various representations of internal variability (Deser et al., 2012; we note that ensembles are not necessary for the nuclear conflict scenarios since the much larger magnitude of forcing provides a higher signal-to-noise ratio). The anomaly in the ensemble mean shown here thus cleanly captures the response of surface ocean pH to volcanic eruptions. Here we show the anomaly in preindustrial pH (pH anomalies in equilibrium with preindustrial atmospheric CO2, which is computed simultaneously with contemporary pH at model run time), as the contemporary pH anomalies include also the response to increasing atmospheric CO2 from one year to the next. The similarity in the spatial patterns of volcanically induced pH anomalies and those produced under nuclear conflict is striking (cf. Figures S5 and 2c), suggesting that volcanic forcing produces similar temperature, DIC, and thus pH anomalies (including the El Niño-like response to volcanic forcing in the eastern Equatorial Pacific, described in Eddebbar et al., 2019). However, the eruption-driven pH anomaly is both smaller (an order of magnitude) and of shorter duration (∼2 years) than in the India/Pakistan 47-Tg simulation. Unfortunately, a similar analysis of volcanic Ωarag anomalies in the CESM Large Ensemble was not possible as preindustrial [CO2− 3 ] was not saved to disk. 4. Conclusions and Discussion We report on the surface ocean pH and Ωarag anomalies generated from four simulations of nuclear conflict using the CESM with full ocean carbonate system thermodynamics. Globally averaged surface ocean pH increases in response to each conflict, with the largest increases in the North Atlantic, North Pacific, and Equatorial Pacific Ocean. The pH anomalies persist for 10 years post conflict and are primarily driven by changes in the carbonate chemistry equilibrium constants as a result of decreases in sea surface temperature. In contrast, CESM simulates globally averaged decreases in surface ocean Ωarag in response to nuclear conflict, with the largest decreases in the tropics and subtropics. The Ωarag anomalies persist beyond the length of our 15-year simulations and are driven by a combination of changes in the carbonate chemistry equilibrium constants and the solubility-driven increases in DIC. We further demonstrate that the surface pH anomalies induced by nuclear conflict resemble those induced by volcanic eruptions in the same modeling system. The simulated changes in global and regional pH and Ωarag as a result of nuclear conflict are large and abrupt. In the most extreme forcing scenario (U. S./Russia 150 Tg), over a period of ∼5 years, global surface ocean pH increases by 0.06 units, and Ωarag decreases by 0.3 units. To put these numbers into perspective, this simulated rate of change of pH is 10 times larger than the rate of change we have observed over the past two decades as a result of ocean acidification (−0.0018 year−1; Lauvset et al., 2015). Worryingly, surface ocean Ωarag decreases more than six times faster than has been observed in the open ocean over the past three decades (−0.0095 year−1 at the Bermuda Atlantic time series; Bates et al., 2014). While the cooling associated with nuclear conflict rapidly and briefly alleviates the decline in pH associated with ocean acidification, the increase in solubility causes the ocean to absorb ∼11 Pg of excess carbon in a 10-year period, leading to a rapid drop in Ωarag. Whether and how calcifying organisms might respond to such rapid and opposing changes in pH and Ωarag is as yet unknown. In order to measure organism response to ocean acidification, a majority of laboratory studies perform CO2 bubbling perturbation experiments, which simultaneously decrease the pH and Ωarag in the surrounding seawater solution (Pörtner et al., 2014). This simultaneous change in two carbonate chemistry parameters challenges our ability to isolate the organism response to changes in pH or changes in Ωarag alone. A recent laboratory sensitivity study of marine bivalve larvae used chemical manipulation experiments to decouple these two parameters; they found that larval shell development and growth were negatively impacted by decreasing Ω and unaffected by changes in pH (Waldbusser et al., 2014). If these sensitivities are sustained in other organisms, we might conclude that calcifying organisms would be severely affected by nuclear conflict. Our findings shed light on the ocean biogeochemical response to other forms of extreme external forcing, such as volcanic eruptions (Eddebbar et al., 2019; Frölicher et al., 2011) and solar radiation management climate engineering (Lauvset et al., 2017; Matthews et al., 2009). They may further inform the study and understanding of the role of ocean acidification in marine extinction following the Chicxulub impact event (Henehan et al., 2019). Importantly, our results suggest that even a regional nuclear conflict can have an impact on global ocean acidification, adding to the list of the many, far-reaching consequences of nuclear conflict for global society.

#### Existential risks come first – cognitive bias goes our way

GPP 17 (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf> edited

1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK In his book Reasons and Persons, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater. ... The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy [hu]mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.65 In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75

#### The plantext is neither a starting point nor endpoint of our method --- Demands of the digital age means policy debate is the only solution --- In depth studies and scenario analysis are critical to effective antitrust enforcement

O’Keeffe, 17 (Siún O’Keeffe, Strategy advisor, Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets., Nov 2017, accessed on 9-14-2021, Sci-hub, "Use and Importance of Market Studies in Modern Competition Enforcement", https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpx081)//babcii

Market studies too, can ultimately lead to swifter problem-solving. They allow us to examine a complicated market and establish how it works. This can prove **invaluable to assessments of whether or not particular activities are harmful**. Take the Online Hotel Booking Monitor that was published by EU competition authorities in February 2017. The Monitor examined empirical evidence that showed that many hotels were unaware of the legality or otherwise of the clauses controlling their prices. Also, it revealed no evidence of increased competition in markets where both wide and narrow across platform parity clauses were prohibited, in comparison to markets where only the wide APPA was stopped (through commitments). It is an example of crossborder number-crunching cooperation between 11 member states, including ACM, and the European Commission (in a sector in which authorities are often criticised for a lack of cooperation). ACM recently conducted an online video streaming study, with a focus on online video advertising. The study showed the intricate working of a swiftly moving multi-sided market. Online video platforms compete heavily for consumer attention. This battle primarily takes places in the fields of video-content and new service provision. The study suggested that none of the online video platforms currently has a dominant position in online advertising (it did not further explore content issues). The **large, international platforms** such as YouTube and Facebook face competition on these markets, at present, from each other and from smaller competitors. Online advertisements can be placed in a number of ways. In addition, there are many different companies that sell advertising space and place advertisements. Advertisers are able to choose the type of advertisement, and choose with whom they wish to do business, and they take advantage of these opportunities. There is also sufficient competition between the companies that facilitate the trade of advertising space. Personal data-sets are becoming more and more important in online advertising. However, the study suggested that the large data-sets of established platforms are not an insurmountable barrier for being able to enter this particular market. This study reveals a dynamic market where one player has a certain degree of market power, and **explores scenarios showing potential problems** that could arise. In-depth knowledge of how a market works allows the authority to intervene more quickly in the future, if necessary with interim measures, when a problem does arise. It allows us to combine ‘thinking fast’, with ‘thinking slow’, and it helps to waylay knee-jerk legislative reactions. Interim measures and quick interventions can be invaluable to prevent situations of harm arising. However, they do not replace empirical studies and thorough investigation based on the examination of facts and data. In the digital age, despite all the pressures, there is also a need to heed William Henry Davies’ advice to take the ‘time to stand and stare’ not in the pursuit of leisure, but rather in the pursuit of fact-based decision-making.

#### Specifically true of big tech and antitrust --- Civic monopolization means an informed public is key --- Legal engagement is essential to provide cover for political action

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The digital world is currently out of joint. A small number of tech companies are very large, dominant and growing. They have not just commercial influence, but an impact on our privacy, our freedom of expression, our security, and – as this study has shown – on our civic society. Even if they mean to have a positive and constructive societal impact – as they make clear they do – they are too big and have too great an influence to escape the attention of governments, democratic and non-democratic. Governments have already responded, and more will. Most of these government responses are destined to fail. They are destined to fail for three reasons: they have not yet adequately defined the problem they are trying to solve; they are using tools that are not suited to dealing with these organisations and the services they provide; and they do not have a vision of where they would like digital society to end up. On the first, the problem, this is generally defined narrowly in terms of privacy, security, and economics. Debates on privacy centre on the collection and use of personal data by the tech giants. Those on security focus on the extent to which governments should or should not have access to that personal data. Economic questions relate chiefly to tax and the degree to which the tech giants may be unfairly promoting their own services over those of their competitors. The antitrust case launched by the European Commission against Google in April 2015, for example, centres on the extent to which Google was, or was not, using its position as an intermediary to promote its own shopping service over those of its competitors. The Commission claimed that Google had ‘abused its dominant position in the markets for general internet search services in the European Economic Area (EEA) by systematically favouring its own comparison shopping product in its general search results pages.’330 The Commission may, or may not, be able to show the tech giant biased its results to its own service, but it will much harder to demonstrate how this this hurt the end user, particularly given that the service is provided free at the point of use. This is why, as this study has shown**, the problem also needs to be framed in civic terms**. It needs to be recognized that these organisations and their services are starting to play significant civic roles in democratic society, and that, in playing these roles, **they are gaining political and social power**. Democratic societies may decide, in some cases, that this is a fair trade given the benefits - though there has been precious little discussion to date as to the terms of trade and the advantages and disadvantages of reliance. In other cases, societies may decide the risks outweigh the benefits. They then need to figure out how to respond. Working out how to respond will not be straightforward. The tools currently available to democratic governments – including legislation, regulation and taxation – are not well suited to dealing with the issues raised by the tech giants. These organisations are very large and transnational, often work to a different economic model to other corporations, and work in a communications environment that is fundamentally different from their predecessors. Until we better understand and communicate the dilemmas they raise, and until the public become concerned about the potential – or actual – threats they represent, it will be difficult to respond effectively. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, antitrust law was applied more successfully once the problem of ‘bigness’ – that the law was introduced to address – **was more carefully investigated and exposed**. In January 1903, for example, the first of Ida **Tarbell’s** ‘muckraking’ investigations of John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil was published in McClure’s magazine. In this, and her following articles, Tarbell detailed how the rise to dominance of Standard Oil ‘was aided at every stage by discriminatory railroad rates and illegal tactics – bribery, fraud, criminal underselling and intimidation.’331 Such was the popular response to Tarbell’s investigations that she was lauded as the ‘Joan of Arc among moderns’ and ‘one of the most commanding figures in American letters.’332 Her **exposure of Standard Oil’s history and practices** **helped** Theodore Roosevelt **steer** his **bills against trusts through Congress** – on rail rebates, on the expedition of antitrust action, and on the establishment of a Department of Commerce with a Bureau of Corporations that had powers to investigate trusts. Eight years later, the US Supreme Court ruled that Standard Oil had abused its dominant position and should be broken up. It was **the combination of the investigation, the exposure, and the public response that enabled political action to be taken.** There has, as yet, been no twenty first century equivalent of Ida Tarbell’s investigations into the tech giants. Democratic societies also need a much clearer vision of where they would like to end up. What would a progressive digital future look like? How should plurality and diversity be defined in an age of information abundance? Should the digital civic landscape be devolved or centralized? These democratic objectives will need to include the needs of the citizen as well as the consumer, and of civic society as well as the security state. Such a vision ought to be led by the public, and has to take account of the state of the digital environment over twenty-five years after the advent of the web. The vision is unlikely to include over reliance on a small cadre of transnational tech companies, but may well include the convenience and efficiency that comes from using one provider for certain services like general search. Without greater clarity on the potential consequences of digital dominance, and a clearer vision of where democratic societies would like to end up, **there is a risk that they jeopardize the** tremendous civic benefits of **digital technology, and fail to build a digital ecosystem** that enables civic participation while protecting citizen’s rights. Without devising progressive responses democratic societies will be left with two alternatives, neither of which is attractive. They can take a laissez-faire approach, accepting that the digital environment will be dominated by a handful of tech giants, and that the most effective way of affecting their behaviour is through persuasion and collaboration. Or, they can react regressively to digital developments, banning services, imposing punishments and even prosecuting organisations and employees who run the tech companies’ tools. Democratic societies do not yet understand the phenomenon of the tech giants, what the phenomenon means in civic terms, what benefits it brings to governance, and the dangers inherent in it. Only once they understand the phenomenon better, and understand where it can help **and where it can damage civic society, will they be in a position to work out how best to respond.**

#### History proves the correlation between legal engagement and effective regulation --- Past tech monopolies prove the process of the 1AC effectively garners concessions from monopolies that solve even absent antitrust

Carlsson and Swartz, 21 (Philipp Carlsson-Szlezak and Paul Swartz, Carlsson-Szlezak is a managing director and partner in BCG’s New York office and global chief economist of BCG. Paul Swartz is a director and senior economist at the BCG Henderson Institute, based in BCG’s New York office., 8-18-2021, accessed on 9-14-2021, Fortune, "Popular outrage, not economics, will determine the fate of Big Tech", <https://fortune.com/2021/08/18/big-tech-breakup-antitrust-popular-outrage-facebook-google-standard-oil-microsoft/>)//Babcii

The power of the biggest tech companies has grown too ubiquitous to ignore—their dominance can be felt in the stock indexes, in segments of the labor market, and in the oversight (or lack thereof) of public discourse, to name just a few areas of influence. Little surprise, then, that [the political script](https://fortune.com/2021/06/24/house-panel-big-tech-facebook-google/) appears to be at a turning point: Regulatory agencies, now [staffed with vocal critics of the industry](https://fortune.com/2021/06/30/ftc-chair-lina-khan-populist-antitrust-movement-what-can-she-do-federal-trade-commission/), are accelerating the pursuit, with [Facebook](https://fortune.com/company/facebook) and [Google](https://fortune.com/company/alphabet) squarely [in the crosshairs](https://fortune.com/2021/01/04/facebook-antitrust-lawsuit-ftc-entrepreneurs-innovation/) of antitrust litigation. Yet predicting Big Tech’s comeuppance could be a losing bet. The path from corporate power to regulatory backlash is neither linear nor predominantly about economics. What’s overlooked in today’s debate is the catalyzing power of popular outrage. The presence of such anger has reliably aligned political will and driven regulatory pushback in the past—and its absence has slowed or prevented such pushback. To see why the political economy of outrage will likely shape [Big Tech’s regulatory fate](https://fortune.com/tag/big-tech/), a brief tour of U.S. history is a good starting point. The legacy of Ida Tarbell The Sherman Act and the dismemberment of Standard Oil in 1911 are often invoked today to highlight regulatory risk and power. However, a more interesting question is why the Sherman Act, passed in 1890, sat idle for nearly 20 years, even as politicians watched Standard Oil’s growing abuse of its market power. What changed? What forced Teddy Roosevelt’s hand wasn’t economic benchmarks such as peaking market share or high prices. It was Ida Tarbell, a star of the emerging field of muckraker journalism, who was on a mission of personal revenge to expose the Rockefeller empire. Her [History of the Standard Oil Company](https://energyhistory.yale.edu/library-item/ida-m-tarbell-history-standard-oil-company-1904) (1904) was a bestseller, serialized in McClure’s Magazine to great effect, and successfully galvanized public opinion against the Rockefellers and their monopoly. Growing up, Tarbell had witnessed Standard Oil bullying her father to sell his oil business—when he refused, the family had to mortgage their home. As such, the birth of U.S. antitrust action captures enduring political-economy dynamics: Standard Oil had enormous political **clout** and averted regulatory action for years. Yet, a groundswell of popular anger was sufficient to align political incentives to apply the law to Standard Oil. It would be a **mistake to see Tarbell’s victory as a case of idiosyncratic history**. On the contrary, the force of public outrage—surprisingly often channeled via the vehicle of literature—plays out again and again in the 20th century. Consider the emergence of the Food and Drug Administration, for example. Upton Sinclair, a contemporary of Tarbell’s, published The Jungle a little after Tarbell’s History. Despite being a work of fiction, The Jungle spawned massive popular backlash against the disgusting conditions in the meat processing plants of Chicago—the reading remains revolting to this day. The public reaction to Sinclair’s story, initially published in 1905, pushed President Roosevelt to sign the Pure **F**ood and **D**rug **A**ct, which passed by an overwhelming bipartisan majority of 63 to 4 in the Senate in 1906 and founded what is now the FDA. There are many other examples of popular resentment driving regulatory action: The financial Panic of 1907 helped create the Federal Reserve; Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring contributed to the swaying of another Republican President, Richard Nixon, to create the **E**nvironmental **P**rotection **A**gency; the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 led to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau—and so on. Without outrage, regulators meander While the historical examples above draw straight lines from anger to regulatory shock, it is true that some of the biggest antitrust cases in U.S. regulatory history meandered for decades—antitrust cases against **AT&T,** [**IBM**](https://fortune.com/company/ibm)**, and** later [**Microsoft**](https://fortune.com/company/microsoft) come to mind. Here, too, popular backlash—or the lack of it—played a critical role in shaping their regulatory fates. Yes, AT&T was broken up—in 1982. But its conflict with antitrust regulators had begun all the way back in 1913. Over the years, the company bounced around from being viewed as a good monopoly to being a state-sanctioned monopoly (recall you had to rent your phone from Ma Bell—but couldn’t own it). After a meandering 70-year regulatory pursuit, AT&T lost its case and agreed to break up on Jan. 8, 1982. By contrast, on that same day in 1982, a 30-year–long regulatory pursuit of IBM was dropped. Yet **despite avoiding a breakup**, the cumulative **impact on IBM was** arguably more **significant** than that on AT&T. IBM had been pushed into unbundling hardware and software, which successfully **opened space for new software** behemoths—leaving IBM strategically on the back foot. Popular anger did not underpin the regulatory pursuits of Ma Bell and Big Blue. They did not inspire indignation, perhaps because expensive long-distance calls and clunky computers did not spark emotion—or perhaps because their stories lacked their Tarbell or Sinclair. That did not prevent regulatory action, but that action played out on the battlefield of technocratic concern, which translated into a long-winded **regulatory dance and yielded outcomes** far preferable to Standard Oil’s fate. Microsoft, which moved into the space that IBM’s curtailment had opened, remains an interesting case in the context of outrage and regulation. For there was—some—outrage. It’s easy to forget how loathed in some quarters the firm and Bill Gates were in the late 1990s, just around the time when regulatory scrutiny peaked: the bullying of Netscape, the bundling of software, Gates’ widely panned deposition performance in testimony before Congress, all drove popular dislike if not quite mass resentment. What remains mostly forgotten today is that the judge ruled, in 2000, that Microsoft should break up—delivering a fast judgment aligned with popular sentiment of recent years. Yet the outrage didn’t sustain itself through political transition and appeal. In 2001 the Justice Department said it was no longer seeking a breakup and agreed to a settlement. Is Big Tech more like Standard Oil, or IBM? While history should always be used with care, the correlation between popular backlash (or lack thereof) and sharp regulatory backlash (or lack thereof) remains compelling. In some ways, this is more surprising if we think of antitrust regulation as a field of technocratic economic analysis, and less surprising if we think of it as politicians responding to incentives—such as when the influence of corporate power is outweighed by the electoral threat of outrage.

# 2AC

## Adv---Primacy

### 2AC --- O/V --- Russia

#### The threat of Russia is justified

Gershom **Gorenberg 16**. Senior correspondent for The Prospect. 10-11-2016. "The Strange Sympathy of the Far Left for Putin." American Prospect. http://prospect.org/article/strange-sympathy-far-left-putin

The fact is that President Barack Obama is worthy of serious criticism for his policy in Syria—not because his administration has done too much, but because it has done too little to stop crimes against humanity. I say this with caution: I can't claim to know what a good policy in Syria would have been, or would be now. Some of the advocates of much greater U.S. military involvement, it seems to me, err on the side of regarding America as militarily omnipotent, and the president as politically omnipotent. The first supposition was disproved by George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq. And in a democracy, one price of fighting an unnecessary war is weakening or erasing political support for military action when, in our tragic world, it is morally necessary. Yet depending for so long on diplomacy alone has given Putin and Assad a free hand. And a likely result of restoring all Syria to regime control would be a bloodbath against his opponents. Putin's far-left cheering squad, it seems, is still living sometime in the Cold War, dividing the world into Western imperialists and their opponents, and placing Moscow on the side of the opponents. This is a grotesquely simple moral universe. Strangely, it also combines living a few decades in the past with a lack of historical perspective. Russia's imperialist goal of extending its power into what were once Ottoman lands began before 1917, carried on in Soviet days with an ideological overlay, and continues today. To preserve its foothold in Syria, Russia is prepared to destroy whatever is left of that country. One more speaker at that Moscow conference last December was retired general Michael Flynn, who became a campaign surrogate for Donald Trump. This points to the final, immense irony: The far-left apologists share the stage with Trump and his fellow admirers of Putin's authoritarian regime. The extremes meet—useful idiots all.

## 2AC --- OFF

### 2AC ---- Aymara CP

#### 3. Can’t solve the aff --- No government language zeroes solvency

White 0. Lucie WHITE. Professor of Law, Harvard. 19 St. Louis University Public Law Review 431. Lexis.

Throughout this essay, I have felt uncomfortable with much of the language I have used. I do not like the tone that gets set when words like "client services" and "formerly homeless individual" are repeatedly used. Yet this is the language that is used in the domain of employment services - by the groups who are doing it, by the governmental agencies that are funding and regulating it, and by the academics who are evaluating and researching it. I [\*452] could create my own different language to describe what very low income people need in the way of help with finding jobs. Yet the project of seeking to link a pragmatic internal critique with the abolitionist aspiration is one that challenges us to speak inside of that language at the same time that we seek to push beyond it. Even as I pursue that dangerous project, I feel qualms about whether the project is worth doing at all, from a political perspective. Perhaps it is best to leave the domain of homeless service programs alone, and concern ourselves instead with the few projects - like the late Mitch Snyder's Center for Creative Non-Violence, or On the Rise in Boston, which empowers homeless women - that do not choose to take the state's money, or to speak its language, and have no confusion about "which side" they are on.

#### 4. Nuclear english isn’t calcified – intent and content trump form

Ortiz 11 (Simon, Acoma Pueblo poet, writer, professor at Arizona State University, is author of more than twenty books, including Woven Stone, Out There Somewhere, Beyond the Reach of Time and Change, from Sand Creek, Men on the Moon, The Good Rainbow Road, and others. Currently, he is cowriting with Gabriela Schwab a dialogic book tentatively titled Children of Fire, Children of Water, focused on personal, cultural, political, and historical trauma and memory. <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/journals/american_indian_quarterly/v035/35.3.ortiz.html> //shree)

Obviously, I have been speaking to you in the English language—the enemy's language, so to speak, which it is to some extent but not entirely so because it has become our language to a large degree—and I have been doing so in order to have you gain an understanding of what I mean. At the same time, I'm sure you realize I am speaking of an Indigenous consciousness and I am speaking with an Indigenous consciousness so that you may realize it is possible to convey and converse within the worldview of our Indigenous cultural consciousness-awareness while using a colonial language such as English. Actually, we have experienced this phenomenon of transcultural communication for a long time, perhaps even from the very first moment we encountered English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese, but the limiting and destructive processes of colonialism prevented us, for a long time, from gaining a positive understanding and expressive-creative use of those European languages. Instead, we have been burdened with English and other colonial languages as sad, stunting, and tortuous barriers to positive growth as Indigenous peoples even as we have made, at the same time, some amazing, profound, and awesome achievements using the English language.

#### 5. Presencing Aymara in debate makes imperial intrusion easier

Linder & Stetson 9 (Keith Lindner, Postdoctoral Fellow in Geography @ Vassar, and George Stetson, phd from Colorado State in Political Science, For Opacity: Nature, Difference and Indigeneity in Amazonia. Topia 21, <http://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/topia/article/viewFile/23254/31286> //shree)

This paper seeks a partial way out of this impasse by approaching questions of indigeneity and nature in the context of an ethical engagement with difference. Combining an explicit politicization of scholarly work—working to write with, rather than about—with an explicit ethical stance, one that refuses to decisively delineate what indigenous identity really is, might begin to work against the potential harmful affects of both essentialist and deconstructionist readings of indigeneity and nature. To do so, we seek to initiate a shift away from conceptualizing alterity—human and non-human—as an effect or articulation of power, toward alterity as an opacity that is itself productive of effects that demand ethical response. We read our recent involvements with the alternative development NGO Village Earth through the work of the postcolonial theorist, novelist and poet Édouard Glissant. Drawing on Glissant’s concept of opacity, we argue that a move away from questions of identity and a commitment to foregrounding opacity can produce an ethical mode of relation between scholars and the Others they study—what we call opaque alliance. Our central argument is that an ethical response to alterity means foregrounding, rather than submerging, opacity. We turn to Glissant not because he is the first to mobilize these theoretical ideas,2 but because we have found his work to be underutilized in our disciplinary homes of geography and political science, yet useful as we negotiate the difficulties of fieldwork and think about how to engage ethically with alterity. Further, “nature” figures prominently in Glissant’s work, particularly his literary and poetic work, in complex ways. We take as primary two seemingly simple suggestions from Glissant that have farreaching implications: first, he urges us to “give up this old obsession with discovering what lies at the bottom of natures” (Glissant 1997: 190). Second, he argues that we should instead “[l]et our understanding prefer the gesture of giving-on-and-with that opens finally on totality” (192). More than simply writing with the Other, Glissant helps to cultivate an ethics for engaging in collective projects. We focus on our ethnographic and political engagements with Shipibo indigenous peoples in the Peruvian Amazon, but also gesture toward the ways ithat our arguments about ethical engagement might be taken up in relation to non-human nature via a detour through Glissant’s literary work. The productivity of opacity demands response in concrete contexts, and this paper attempts to provide several examples where Glissant’s twin suggestions help to do so ethically. Transparency/Opacity/Encounter. In addition to the complex terrain of indigeneity and nature described above, numerous indigenous intellectuals have articulated critiques of the objectifying and colonizing effects of Western epistemology and what might be called the ethno-colonial gaze (Deloria 1988; Tuhiwai Smith 1999; Vizenor 1999; Vizenor and Lee 2003). The oppression produced by the gaze of the colonizer or master “is repeated in that of historically later types of ‘discoverer,’ such as the ethnologist for whom the colonized people are merely visible objects of knowledge” (Britton 1999: 23). Glissant critiques such a gaze in his discussion of transparency: [i]f we examine the process of “understanding” people and ideas from the perspective of Western thought, we discover that its basis is this requirement for transparency. In order to understand and thus accept you ... I have to reduce. (Glissant 1997: 189-90) Understanding, by striving to render all things transparent, aims at “grasping,” where “the verb to grasp contains the movement of hands that grab their surroundings and bring them back to themselves. A gesture of enclosure if not appropriation” (191-92). The seemingly innocuous exercise of understanding, for Glissant, represents an act of violence laid bare under the gaze of Western science and other knowledge-producing practices as the Other is rendered perfectly transparent, knowable and therefore controllable—created afresh within the conceptual schema of the observer. Certainly, Peru’s National Museum functions in this way.

### 2AC --- K (Harvard AF) --- F/L

#### Agathangelou link ---

#### 1. IR is reflexive and effective---its track record of prediction proves.

Dan Reiter 15. Professor of Political Science at Emory University. “Scholars Help Policymakers Know Their Tools.” War on the Rocks. 8-27-2015. <https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/scholars-help-policymakers-know-their-tools/>

This critique is both narrowly true and narrow in perspective. Context is of course important, but foreign policy choices are not sui generis, there are patterns across space and time that inform decision-making. Policymakers recognize this and routinely draw lessons from history when making foreign policy decisions. As noted below, policymakers in other areas such as development and public health routinely rely on broader, more general studies to craft policy. And, broader scholarship can improve foreign policy performance, as evidenced by the ability of IR academics to build on their own work to predict outcomes, including for example forecasting the lengths of the conventional and insurgency phases of the U.S.–Iraq conflict in the 2000s.

But, even if one were to accept the limits of general work, there is a growing body of academic work that evaluates foreign policy tools as applied to a specific country or region. These studies ask questions such as whether:

Development projects reduced insurgent violence in Afghanistan; Drone strikes reduced insurgent violence in Pakistan; Development programs increased civic participation and social capital in Sudan; Building cell phone towers in Iraq reduced insurgent violence; Attempts to reintegrate combatants into society in Burundi succeeded; Security sector reform in Liberia increased the legitimacy of the government there; Road projects in India reduced insurgent violence; We can understand peacekeeping’s failure in Congo; Israel’s targeted assassinations reduced violent attacks from militants.

This is not by any means a dismissal of professional intelligence work. Academics are not intelligence analysts: They do not have access to contemporary intelligence data, nor are they generally trained to do things like examine the latest satellite photos of North Korean nuclear activities and make judgments about North Korea’s current plutonium production. And certainly, academic IR work can never replace professional intelligence work. But the best policy decisions marry timely, specific intelligence with academic work that has a more general perspective.

A third critique is that much of this academic work on foreign policy tools is unusable by policymakers because it is too quantitative and technically complex. Here, echoing a point made by Erik Voeten, there is a danger in not appreciating the importance of rigorous research design, including sophisticated quantitative techniques, for crafting effective policy. Sophisticated research design is not the enemy of effective policy, it is critically necessary for it. Certainly, the current academic focus on building research designs that permit causal inference speaks exactly to what policymakers care about the most: if implementing a certain policy will cause the desired outcome.

Or, put differently, bad research designs make for bad public policy. A classic example is school busing. In the 1960s and early 1970s, some cities adopted voluntary integration programs for public schools, in which families could volunteer to bus their children to schools in neighborhoods with different racial majorities. Policymakers used the favorable results for the voluntary programs to make the improper inference that mandatory busing policies would also work. The result was bad public policy and violence in the streets.

Sophisticated technical methods can improve our ability to make causal inferences, and can help solve other empirical problems. Consider that the heart of successful counterinsurgency is, according to U.S. military doctrine, winning the support of the population. Assessing whether certain policies do win public support requires collecting opinion data. A conventional method for measuring popular opinion is the survey, but of course, individuals in insurgency-stricken areas may be unwilling to reveal their true opinions to a survey-taker out of fear for their personal safety. Methodologists have crafted sophisticated techniques for addressing this issue, improving our ability to measure public support for the government in these areas. These techniques have been used to assess better the determinants of public support in insurgency-affected countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India.

Going forward, we will continue to need advanced methodologies to address pressing policy questions. Consider the U.S. military’s commitment to gender integration. The implementation of this commitment will be best informed if it rests on rigorous social science that address outstanding questions. Is there a Sacagawea effect, in which mixed gender units engaged in counterinsurgency are more effective than male-only units? How might mixed gender affect small unit cohesion in combat? How might mixed gender units reduce the incidence of sexual assault, both within the military and of assault committed by troops against civilians?

Certainly, other areas of public policy understand the importance of rigorous research design. Economic and development policy communities read the work of and employ economics Ph.D.s. Policymakers incorporate the findings of sophisticated studies on policy areas such as microfinance, gender empowerment, and foreign aid, knowing the best policy decisions must incorporate these studies’ findings.

Or consider public health policy. Lives are literally on the line as decision-makers must make decisions about issues such as vaccinations, nutritional recommendations, and air quality. Policymakers know they must use sophisticated technical studies executed by epidemiologists and other public health academics to craft the best policies.

Critics will argue that some U.S. policymakers remain alienated from contemporary academic IR work, with the suggestion that if IR academics let go of an obsession with technique, they will then be better able to connect with policymakers and help them craft better policy. I agree that IR academics need to find ways to communicate their results in clear, non-technical language. But the technical components of the work need to be there. Stripping them out directly undermines the ability of the research to give the right kinds of policy recommendations.

Let me conclude by noting that I am sympathetic to the concern that IR academics should think about the big picture as well as smaller questions, the forest of grand strategy as well as the trees of foreign policy tools. IR academics have the potential to make real contributions to big picture debates, to think hard about the essence of grand strategy by assembling a framework that effectively integrates foreign policy means and ends. The nature of the IR subfield and its integration of political economy and security, and its ability to think about structure as well as units, make it especially well positioned to consider these broad questions. The ability of IR academics to contribute to contemporary foreign policy debates is one of many reasons why political science should retain the subfield of IR and resist the temptation to replace the traditional empirical subfields of IR, comparative, and American with new subfields of conflict, political economy, behavior, and institutions.

Like good carpenters, foreign policymakers need to know their tools. Rigorous IR research is the only way to evaluate them effectively.

#### 2. Empiricism is the only way to understand the world---proves the K doesn’t turn the case

Stephen Walt, 2005. “The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 8: 23-48. Emory Libraries.

First and most obviously, a good theory should be logically consistent and empirically valid, because a logical explanation that is consistent with the available evidence is more likely to provide an accurate guide to the causal connections that shape events.

Second, a good theory is complete; it does not leave us wondering about the causal relationships at work (Van Evera 1997). For example, a theory stating that “national leaders go to war when the expected utility of doing so outweighs the expected utility of all alternative choices” (Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman 1992) may be logically impeccable, but it does not tell us when leaders will reach this judgment. Similarly, a theory is unsatisfying when it identifies an important causal factor but not the factor(s) most responsible for determining outcomes. To say that “human nature causes war,” or even that “oxygen causes war,” is true in the sense that war as we know it cannot occur in the absence of these elements. But such information does not help us understand what we want to know, namely, when is war more or less likely? Completeness also implies that the theory has no “debilitating gaps,” such as an omitted variable that either makes its predictions unacceptably imprecise or leads to biased inferences about other factors (Nincic & Lepgold 2000, p. 28).

A third desideratum is explanatory power. A theory’s explanatory power is its ability to account for phenomena that would otherwise seem mystifying. Theories are especially valuable when they illuminate a diverse array of behavior that previously seemed unrelated and perplexing, and they are most useful when they make apparently odd or surprising events seem comprehensible (Rapaport 1972). In physics, it seems contrary to common sense to think that light would be bent by gravity. Yet Einstein’s theory of relativity explains why this is so. In economics, it might seem counterintuitive to think that nations would be richer if they abolished barriers to trade and did not try to hoard specie (as mercantilist doctrines prescribed). The Smith/Ricardo theory of free trade tells us why, but it took several centuries before the argument was widely accepted (Irwin 1996). In international politics, it seems odd to believe that a country would be safer if it were unable to threaten its opponent’s nuclear forces, but deterrence theory explains why mutual vulnerability may be preferable to either side having a large capacity to threaten the other side’s forces (Wohlstetter 1957, Schelling 1960, Glaser 1990, Jervis 1990). This is what we mean by a powerful theory: Once we understand it, previously unconnected or baffling phenomena make sense.

Fourth, at the risk of stating the obvious, we prefer theories that explain an important phenomenon (i.e., something that is likely to affect the fates of many people). Individual scholars may disagree about the relative importance of different issues, but a theory that deals with a problem of some magnitude is likely to garner greater attention and/or respect than a theory that successfully addresses a puzzle of little intrinsic interest. Thus, a compelling yet flawed explanation for great power war or genocide is likely to command a larger place in the field than an impeccable theory that explains the musical characteristics of national anthems.

Fifth, a theory is more useful when it is prescriptively rich, i.e., when it yields useful recommendations (Van Evera 1997). For this reason, George advises scholars to “include in their research designs variables over which policymakers have some leverage” (George 2000, p. xiv; also Glaser & Strauss 1967, Stein 2000). Yet a theory that does not include manipulable variables may still be useful to policy makers. For example, a theory that explained why a given policy objective was impossible might be very useful if it convinced a policy maker not to pursue such an elusive goal. Similarly, a theory that accurately forecast the risk of war might provide a useful warning to policy makers even if the variables in the theory were not subject to manipulation.

Finally, theories are more valuable when they are stated clearly. Ceteris paribus, a theory that is hard to understand is less useful simply because it takes more time for potential users to master it. Although academics often like to be obscure (because incomprehensibility can both make scholarship seem more profound and make it harder to tell when a particular argument is wrong), opacity impedes scientific progress and is not a virtue in theoreticalwork. An obscure and impenetrable theory is also less likely to influence busy policy makers.

#### 3. IR scholarship is not intrinsically racist and imperial, especially regarding the liberal order.

Gideon Rose 16, editor of Foreign Affairs, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, March/April 2016, “Review of, ‘White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations,’” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2016-02-16/white-world-order-black-power-politics-birth-american

In this interesting and important yet flawed book, Vitalis seeks to bridge the “vast gulf divid[ing] international relations from Africana studies,” bringing the “racism [of the discipline of international relations] to light.” Conventional narratives of the field’s history, he argues, trace it to the rise of realism and national security concerns in the years around World War II, adding a few historical thinkers, such as Thucydides, to claim a timeless intellectual pedigree. But this ignores both the extensive mainstream scholarship of the first decades of the twentieth century that dealt with colonialism and racial issues and the pioneering work of African American writers in what he calls “the Howard School.” Consigning both to the memory hole, he says, paints a distorted picture of the discipline’s origins and nature, obscuring the role that international relations scholarship has played in the construction and perpetuation of white Western dominance.

These are major claims, and some of them hold up better than others. Vitalis is correct to shine a spotlight on the forgotten academic work of the first third of the twentieth century and offers a timely reminder of just how prevalent racialized thinking was and how central a role imperialism—as opposed to straightforward great-power relations—played in global affairs. Back then, for example, “policy relevance” in political science often meant figuring out how to train good colonial administrators. Vitalis also provides a service by telling the story of scholars such as Alain Locke, Ralph Bunche, and Rayford Logan, enriching readers’ understanding of midcentury intellectual debates over U.S. foreign policy and tracing how racism operated inside various professional institutions.

Vitalis is less convincing, however, in casting his analysis as an indictment of the postwar discipline of international relations, let alone its contemporary incarnation. To get there, one has to share his politics. Vitalis sees a project of U.S. imperial domination playing out over the course of the past century, with the “subjection” continuing today, “through new-old policies of intervention, tutelage, and targeted killings in new-old zones of anarchy and civilization deficit.” Given such a reading of U.S. foreign policy, it is not surprising that he believes “the history of ideas, institutions, and practices [in the field] has a constitutive role in their present forms and functions”—or that he sees today’s mainstream international relations scholars as handmaidens of an evil national security state and as the direct descendants of their racist predecessors of a century ago.

Scorning the notion that the postwar liberal international order represents anything particularly new or admirable, Vitalis scores a few points in noting how long it took for some earlier social and racial hierarchies, both international and domestic, to erode. But he refuses to accept the fact that they have indeed eroded. One is left wanting more analysis of how and why the attitudes and patterns of domination Vitalis describes gave way over time, and how the midcentury theorists and practitioners of the liberal international order understood and handled the paradoxes of its halting and inconsistent implementation.

#### 4. Society is sustainable because of the shift to a knowledge economy---AND making it faster is key to outrun entropy---extinction

Gennady Shkliarevsky 18, professor of history at Bard College where he has taught since 1985, 1-5-2018, "Tax Cuts and the Problem of Economic Growth," International Policy Digest, https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/01/05/tax-cuts-and-the-problem-of-economic-growth/

Does this problem have a solution? Is it possible for humanity to break out of the current vicious circle and achieve a constant, stable, sustained, or even exponentially increasing economic progress? Production and consumption are the two most important categories in our economy and economic thinking. They constrain each other and this mutual constraint acts as a limitation on the rate of our economic growth. The typical effect of the expansion of production is the increase in supply. Supply growth results in declining prices. The decline in prices signals that the market is saturated and production must slow down. When production slows down, supply diminishes and prices begin to grow, which triggers a new expansion of production. When production expands, our wealth grows and economy appreciates. Consumption generally depreciates products and thus our wealth declines and our economy depreciates. Thus, production and consumption constrain each other and this constraint limits the rate of our economic growth. In order to solve this problem and achieve constant growth, we need to constantly rejuvenate our economy, we need to ensure a sustained supply of new products to the market and, moreover, we need to make sure that these products are needed. The main economic problem we face today is precisely in bringing novelties to the marketplace. Many business people, economists, pundits and politicians have stressed that we will have to innovate our way out of the current economic predicament. Therefore, creativity and creation are the key to solving the problem of growth. However, creativity, or what we call entrepreneurship when we talk about economy, is not a science. We cannot use it in any predictable way. It is a very uncertain and contingent factor that is fraught with many unknowns and surprises. Therefore, the problem of economic growth is reformulated into the problem of how to make innovation constant, predictable, and steady, rather than sporadic and contingent. In other words, how can we control our creativity? As has already been pointed out, consumption acts as a constraint on production. Production appreciates and consumption depreciates. The tendency of consumption to depreciate our economy is the reason for the existence of limits to rates of economic growth. As one can see, production and consumption are two most essential economic functions. They are mutually dependent, complementary and cannot exist without each other. The problem for achieving constant and sustained growth is that their vectors point in different directions: one toward appreciation and the other toward depreciation. However, do they have to be opposed to each other? There are two kinds of consumption that we know. One kind of consumption is consumption of final products. Indeed, this kind of consumption always depreciates products. You drive your new car out of the parking lot and it immediately loses value. But this form of consumption is not the only one we know. There is also a form of consumption that appreciates products, for example, consumption of raw materials or semi-finished products. Another interesting case of consumption that appreciates is the consumption of technological devices and machines. Indeed, physical use of such devices and machines depreciates them. However, they also represent certain technological knowledge. Knowledge consumption involves our mind. Mental consumption inevitably involves mediation and, therefore, construction that takes place in our mind. In other words, in order to consume something our mind has to create forms of mediation that allow us to consume this something, or, in other words, we have to produce it in our mind. Our sense organs transmit to our brain electrical signals that the brain interprets. We produce reality and production necessarily involves appreciation. Thus mental consumption involves necessarily the creation of new knowledge and hence appreciation. The above argument bears one important conclusion that consumption does not necessarily involve depreciation. Consumption can also, like production, be associated with appreciation, particularly consumption that involves mental activity that is associated with production of knowledge, or creation. We live in the era of knowledge society when knowledge is the main means of production and the principal product. The share of knowledge production by comparison with the production of consumer goods is constantly growing and already begins to outstrip the latter. Since consumption of knowledge, just like its production, is associated with appreciation, the transition to knowledge society suggests that in the modern economy both consumption and production will lead to appreciation and increase in wealth. They do not stand opposed to each other and their balance does not slow down the economy but is the source of its appreciation and constant growth. Balance in this case means that when production grows, so does consumption and both contribute to appreciation of the economy and economic growth. The constraint on the rates of growth disappears and the pace of economic growth can accelerate. The combined effect of growth that comes from production and consumption is double from what it is in our current economy. In other words, economic growth becomes exponential and limitless: as production increases, so does consumption, and more consumption leads to greater appreciation and greater wealth. This infinite and exponential economic growth is not only possible, but is, in fact, essential. Without such growth our civilization simply cannot exist. Our civilization is essentially a dissipative system that constantly generates entropy. As soon as this system ceases to create new levels and forms of organization, it begins to deplete available resources. The only way it can sustain itself indefinitely is by constantly redefining itself in ways that allow us to capture new flows of energy and resources; and where there are new flows of energy and resources, work can be performed. It is our destiny to play this catch-up game, and the only way we can play it indefinitely is by constantly creating new levels and forms of organization of reality so as to maintain the overall entropy level at zero. There is no way for our civilization to go back to less powerful levels of organization of social production, as advocated by the adepts of de-growth, or even to maintain the same level of production organization (steady-state economy). Limits to growth or de-growth are not ultimately realistic possibilities. Our civilization can only move forward. If we decide to terminate the progress of our civilization, we will embark on the path that leads only to its eventual disintegration and disappearance—an option that even supporters of limits to growth or de-growth do not want to entertain.

#### Waked link ---

#### 1. Competition rhetoric doesn’t cause their impacts.

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However, particular representations do not automatically lead to particular responses as, for instance, proponents of the so-called 'CNN effect' would argue (for an overview of the debates among academic, media and policy-making circles on the 'CNN effect', see Gilboa 2005; see also, Dauber 2001; Eisensee/Stromberg 2007; Livingston/Eachus 1995; O'Loughlin 2010; Perlmutter 1998. 2005; Robinson 1999, 2001). There is no causal relationship between a specific image and a political intervention, in which a dependent variable (the image) would explain the outcome of an independent one (the act). David Perlmutter (1998: l), for instance, explicitly challenges, as he calls it, the 'visual determinism' of images, which dominates political and public opinion. Referring to findings based on public surveys, he argues that the formation of opinions by individuals depends not on images but on their idiosyncratic predispositions and values (see also, Domke ct ah 2002; Perlmutter 2005). Yet, it should also be noted that visuals function as unquestioned referents in international politics when underlining the necessity of such specific policy practices as sanctions, deterrents and/or military cooperation. A good example of this is satellite imagery, which plays a pivotal role in the surveillance and assessment of missile or nuclear proliferation activities by so-called 'rogue states' like Iran and North Korea. Regarded as providing compelling evidence about the stage of development of nuclear facilities or about the collaboration between suspect states, satellite images point to a nexus between visuality, knowledge and international politics wherein this way of seeing consequently enables governments to make legitimate statements, draw conclusions and take informed political action. In sum, the visual provides the foundation for knowledge generation and. in doing so, bestows political responses with legitimacy (cf. Moller 2007). A now famous case-in-point is Colin Powell's PowerPoint presentation at the United Nations Security Council in February 2003. In the briefing, the then US Secretary of State showed satellite images that allegedly proved the existence of Iraqi 'Weapons of Mass Destruction'. What was remarkable about Powell's presentation was that the visual emerged as the primary referent for the US government's casus belli, which, in the words of MacDonald ef ai (2010: 7-8), disclosed the fact that the 'logic of geopolitical reason is now inseparable from its visual representation' (see also, Campbell 2007c; Der Derian 2001). The causal theory of the 'CNN effect', or what Perlmutter (1998: 1) has called above 'visual determinism', misconceives of how the visual recasts the political realm itself (Hansen 2011). Rather than asking whether an image caused an intervention, it should be asked instead how the visual has been involved in structuring the understandings of legitimate action, and how visual representations of different policy options affect particular security practices (Williams 2003: 527). For instance, many scholars have shown that images can provoke particularly emotive responses (Bleiker/Hutchison 2008; Crawford 2000; Hariman/Lucaites 2007; Mercer 2006; Ross 2006). Just one example of the (deliberate) evocation of an emotional reaction is the numerous fundraising campaigns that have been run by different humanitarian aid organizations over the years, in which imagery plays an essential role (Bell/Carens 2004; Dogra 2007; Manzo 2008).

#### 2. We shouldn’t abandon antitrust---it’s a necessary tool to solve both ours and their impacts.

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Considering these four case studies, Americans fighting for racial and economic justice might simply conclude that repealing the antitrust laws is the right course—they appear impotent against corporate power and are unleashed against workers’ collective power. But this would be a mistake. Present-day antitrust dates only to the late 1970s. Starting in that decade, the Supreme Court, joined by the DOJ and the FTC of the Reagan administration in the 1980s, rolled back rules on corporate monopolies, mergers, and coercive practices. This intellectual and legal attack on the antitrust of the New Deal and postwar era was bankrolled by big businesses and succeeded in creating market rules extraordinarily favorable to the Fortune 500.

Antitrust law, which was once a top line cause of populist and progressive movements fighting for a fair and democratic society, did control corporate authority in the past and can do so again. Imagine laws that stopped employers from fixing wages, prevented franchisors from dominating independent franchisees through contract, prohibited firms like Uber from burning through billions of dollars in a campaign to monopolize markets, and protected the rights of workers and independent firms to organize. These rules would break the economic and political dominance of corporate executives and rentiers. Such an antitrust enforcement system, backed by a popular movement, would redistribute power downward from a class of mostly white economic royalists to the multiracial majority in American society.

#### 3. Waked doesn’t assume the aff --- It isn’t coercive --- Other countries want us to regulate our big tech AND are already adopting regs against them without US regulation which disproves the link

Wheeler, 21 (Tom Wheeler, Tom Wheeler is a visiting fellow in Governance Studies at The Brookings Institution. Former chariman of the Chairman of the FCC., 2-10-2021, accessed on 8-18-2021, Brookings, "A focused federal agency is necessary to oversee Big Tech", <https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-focused-federal-agency-is-necessary-to-oversee-big-tech/)//Babcii>

A less obvious challenge presented by **the fed**eral government’**s failure** to effectively oversee the dominant digital companies is how it has left American companies unprotected in regard to the policies of other nations, and even individual American states. The United States is a worldwide leader in digital products and services for many reasons, but most notably because of its uniform market of 325 million consumers in which to develop products, products that are then widely available to an interconnected world. Such an advantage is [threatened](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/03/26/the-tragedy-of-tech-companies-getting-the-regulation-they-want/) when the absence of federal government policy leadership opens the door for policies to be determined by others. In an interconnected world, the absence of national oversight and leadership leaves U.S. companies exposed to rules made by other nations. Because of this absence, there is little American input. Similarly, the **absence of a national policy encourages state governments** to develop their own answers to pressing digital economy questions—answers that run the risk of diminishing the advantage of a uniform national marketplace. States as diverse as [California](https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa) and [Vermont](https://www.vpr.org/post/public-utility-commission-vermont-can-regulate-internet-telecommunications#stream/0) are adopting their own approaches to internet governance, while **foreign nations are filling the leadership void** internationally. The European Union proposed a [**Digital Services Act**](https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-services-act-package) **to regulate the behavior** of online companies. The United Kingdom proposed the creation of a new digital watchdog. Italy [announced](https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN27D0MM) an investigation into Google’s advertising market activities. Germany is [investigating](https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-germany-competition/german-watchdog-launches-new-investigation-into-amazon-report-idUKKBN27D2OO) Amazon’s relationships with third-party sellers. China went so far as to attempt to push a [new internet architecture](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/nato-warns-new-authoritarian/) through the U.N.’s International Telecommunications Union. **American market** oversight **policies have traditionally been the North Star** in the development of international technology policy.[[7]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-focused-federal-agency-is-necessary-to-oversee-big-tech/#footnote-7) Where there is **no policy**, however, **there can be no pole star**. By being absent from the field, the federal government has walked away from a history of American leadership.

#### O’Sullivan link ---

#### It is wrong --- pursuit of power is inevitable – consensus of research

Wolforth 9 (William C. Wohlforth – Dartmouth University International Relations Professor, January 2009, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”, <https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.dartmouth.edu/dist/b/174/files/2013/04/War.pdf>, accessed 8/5/18,)

The historical record surrounding major wars is rich with evidence suggesting that positional concerns over status frustrate bargaining: expensive, protracted conflict over what appear to be minor issues; a propensity on the part of decision makers to frame issues in terms of relative rank even when doing so makes bargaining harder; decision-makers’ inability to accept feasible divisions of the matter in dispute even when failing to do so imposes high costs; demands on the part of states for observable evidence to confirm their estimate of an improved position in the hierarchy; the inability of private bargains to resolve issues; a frequently observed compulsion for the public attainment of concessions from a higher ranked state; and stubborn resistance on the part of states to which such demands are addressed even when acquiescence entails limited material cost. The literature on bargaining failure in the context of power shifts remains inconclusive, and it is premature to take any empirical pattern as necessarily probative. Indeed, Robert Powell has recently proposed that indivisibility is not a rationalistic explanation for war after all: fully rational leaders with perfect information should prefer to settle a dispute over an indivisible issue by resorting to a lottery rather than a war certain to destroy some of the goods in dispute. What might prevent such bargaining solutions is not indivisibility itself, he argues, but rather the parties’ inability to commit to abide by any agreement in the future if they expect their relative capabilities to continue to shift.[22](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f22) This is the credible commitment problem to which many theorists are now turning their attention. But how it relates to the information problem that until recently dominated the formal literature remains to be seen.[23](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f23) The larger point is that positional concerns for status may help account for the puzzle of bargaining failure. In the rational choice bargaining literature, war is puzzling because it destroys some of the benefits or flows of benefits in dispute between the bargainers, who would be better off dividing the spoils without war. Yet what happens to these models if what matters for states is less the flows of material benefits themselves than their implications for relative status? The salience of this question depends on the relative importance of positional concern for status among states. Do Great Powers Care about Status? Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.[24](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f24) By that assumption, once a state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.[25](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f25) People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity.

#### Threats aren’t constructed

Ravenal 9 – Distinguished Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute

(Earl C., also professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, “What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy.” Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society 21.1 (2009) 21-75)

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly (not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section: In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182) Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes: Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly. There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general. This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense. Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives. My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role. Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especiallynational-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed military, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations. Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged. My own direct observation suggests that **defense decision-makers** attempt to **“frame”** the structure of the **problems** that they try to solve **on the basis of the** most accurate intelligence. **They** make it their business to know **where** the **threats come from**. Thus, **threats** are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are). A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is **because something important is riding on the** causal analysis and the contingent **prediction.** For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious,“**rent-seeking” would** not only be shameful; it would **present a** severe risk of career termination**.** And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operatecompared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

### 2AC --- Dalley K --- F/L

#### The U.S. has been the cause of anti-imperialism globally---dismantlement of the four waves of empire building were U.S driven

Deudney and Ikenberry 15 Daniel Deudney, Johns Hopkins University G. John Ikenberry, Princeton University “America’s Impact: The End of Empire and the Globalization of the Westphalian System”, August 2015, <http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/am-impact-dd-gji-final-1-august-2015.pdf>

In contemporary debates, this argument undercuts, modifies, and qualifies characterizations held by so many of the United States as essentially imperial, and the American order as an empire. In our rendering, the United State is not the last Western empire, but the first anti-imperial and post-imperial great power in the global system. Our argument is thus focused on the consequences of American foreign policy for the evolution of the international system, and we do not in this confined treatment offer an explanation for the origins of U.S. foreign policy. In short, we offer an argument about impacts rather than the sources of America’s antiimperial and pro-Westphalian role.

Empires and State Systems: Historical Patterns

Empire has been the historically predominant form of order in world politics. Looking at a time frame of several millennia, there was no global anarchic system until the European explorations and subsequent imperial and colonial ventures connected desperate regional systems, doing so approximately five hundred years ago.7 Prior to this emergence of a globalscope system, the pattern of world politics was characterized by regional systems. These regional systems were initially very anarchic, and marked by high levels of military competition. But almost universally, they tended to consolidate into regional empires which had fairly limited interactions with polities outside their regions.8 Thus, it was empires – not anarchic state systems – that typically dominated the regional systems in all parts of the world.

Within this global pattern of regional empires, European political order was distinctly anomalous because it persisted so long as an anarchy. Despite repeated efforts to consolidate Europe into one empire – or what the Europeans referred to as “universal monarchy” – this region remained a plural, multi-state political order. After the Peace of Westphalia ending the Thirties Year War, this plural anarchic system, the Westphalian system, and was sustained by a rough balance of power among its autonomous states and the weakness of the claimants of European empire. This Westphalian system was based on a roughly equal distribution of power among its major units, sustained by various balancing practices that thwarted a succession of regional European empire-builders, and had an elaborate system of public international law and ideological justification.9 While this system rested on a balance of power, it was juridically crystallized into a system of mutually recognized sovereigns.

Outside of Europe, however, the European states, including those that were most active in preventing empire within Europe, were extraordinarily successful in conquering and colonizing vast areas across oceanic distances.10 The Europeans did not invent empire, but they were spectacularly successful at empire building on a global scope, largely because of the imbalance of power that stemmed from European innovations in technology and organization.11 The Europeans conquered and dominated empires, states, and peoples in every previously loosely coupled or isolated regional system across the world. The Europeans also successfully planted numerous colonies of settlers, mainly in the temperate zones in North and South America, Oceania, and the southern tip of Africa.12 States from the Western European core of the Westphalian system thus brought into existence a global-scale political system made up of vast multi-continental empires of conquered peoples and a scattering of colonial “new Europes.”13

This pattern of European empire building was different from its predecessors, not just in its global scope, but also because the European states were continuously warring against one another for dominance within Europe. These struggles between states within Europe against empire in Europe were fought on a global scale. Thus the first “world war,” defined as a war fought across multiple continents, occurred in the later 18th century. In this struggle Britain sought to thwart French attempts to dominate Europe and the battle lines were in Europe, North America, South Asia, and across the global oceans. This pattern of the globalization of intraEuropean warfare continued in the 20th century with the wars triggered by German efforts to dominate Europe. The growing imbalance of power between the Europeans and the rest of the world during the 18th and 19th century enabled the Europeans to easily expand their empires at the expense of non-Europeans. But during the same periods, the Europeans found it very difficult to conquer each other within Europe. Thus vast armies wrought great destruction fighting over tiny parcels of land in Europe, while comparatively small European imperial expeditionary forces readily mastered non-European armies in the Americas, Africa, and Asia. Thus a balance of power underpinned the Westphalian system in Europe, while an imbalance of power between Europe and the world underpinned imperial expansion.

Anti-imperial and anti-colonial rebellions and resistance are as old as empires, but successful rebellion against European imperial rule outside Europe began in the 18th century with the revolt of the colonial settler colonies in the Americas – first in North America and then in South America. This first wave of settler-colony rebellion marked the end of what historians refer to as the “first British empire,” as well as the first great European empire in the Americas, that of Spain. The success of this first wave of anti-imperial rebellion in Spanish America was crucially facilitated by the weakening of Spain during the Napoleonic wars for domination within Europe.

In the later-19th century, European empire building outside of Europe entered a second wave, enabled by the new industrial technologies that further amplified the imbalance of power between Europeans and non-Europeans, which in turn allowed the Europeans to extend their imperial domination into the large interior spaces of the continents, particularly in Africa and Asia.14 In the 20th century, further wars among the core European states weakened Britain, France, and Holland, the leading European colonial powers, thus creating opportunities for antiimperial independence movements in Asia and Africa. Paradoxically, the fact that the Europeans were continuously fighting one another fueled their imperial ambitions and successes, while at the same time, such wars weakened them and helped enable the success of rebellions against their empires.15 Thus as the British empire was reaching its territorial zenith in the early years of the 20th century, Britain was critically weakened by the world wars in Europe and Asia against the aspiring German and Japanese empire builders.

The territorial aggression of the Axis Powers constitute a third wave of empire building which was short lived and thwarted by the successful mobilization of the “United Nations,” a coalition led by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. A fourth wave of empire building, by the Soviet Union and the international communist movement in the second half of the 20th century, was thwarted and dismantled by the United States and its allies.

The Pattern of American Anti-Imperial, Anti-Colonial, and Pro-Westphalian Impacts

Against the backdrop of this evolution of the international system and the four waves of empire building and dismantlement, it becomes possible to see more clearly the many ways in which the United States played important anti-imperial, anti-colonial, and pro-Westphalian roles.16

In each of the four waves of empire building and dismantlement, the United States had an impact. The United States was the first “new nation” to emerge from a rebellion against European imperial rule during the first wave of modern empire. The United States also supported the independence of other European settler colonies throughout the Americas and, with the Monroe Doctrine, helped sustain their independence against European efforts to recolonize parts of the Americas. In the second wave of late 19th century empire-building, the United States, despite its great relative power, did not establish an empire of its own of any significance or duration. And during the latter part of the 20th century, the United States pushed European decolonization, thus facilitating the breakup of second wave empires. In the great world wars in the 20th century, the United States played an important role in thwarting a third wave of imperial projects of Germany, Japan, and Italy. In the second half of the 20th century, the United States played decisive roles, both ideological and military, in thwarting the fourth wave of empire building, the expansion of the communist great power, the Soviet Union, as well as communist coups and revolutions in many weak and small independent states.

[Table ommited]

The United States also played a variety of important roles in building and strengthening Westphalian institutions, moderating inter-state anarchy, and facilitating the ability of states to survive as independent members of international society. From its inception, the United States was precocious in its support for the law of nations, the institutions of the society of states, particularly the laws of war and neutrality, and public international law, as a means of restraining war and aggression. In both the 19th and 20th centuries, the United States, first regionally and then globally, inspired and helped legitimate anti-colonial and anti-imperial independence movements and national liberation struggles among peoples struggling against empires all over the world. In the 20th century, the United States led the efforts to institutionalize Westphalian norms of non-aggression and sovereign independence, first with the League of Nations and then with the United Nations Charter. In the second half of the 20th century, the American-led liberal international order institutionalized free trade and multilateral cooperation, thus providing the infrastructure for a global economic system, thus enabling smaller and weaker states to sustain their sovereign. Also in the second half of the 20th century, the American system of military alliances contributed to the dampening of violent conflicts among allied states, particularly in Europe and East Asia, thus protecting the Westphalian system from the return of violent conflict and empire-building.

[Table ommited]

Taken together, these varied American activities in the world clearly provide strong preliminary evidence for our claim that the United States has significantly contributed to the dismantlement of empires, the thwarting of further empire-building, and to the universalization, institutionalization, and stabilization of the Westphalian state-system.

#### 3. Dally is wrong --- Existential fears need not be settler projections of demise but can be contingently appropriated to reverse indigenous erasure

Weiss 15—Ph.D. candidate, Anthropology, University of Chicago (Joseph, “UNSETTLING FUTURES: HAIDA FUTURE-MAKING, POLITICS AND MOBILITY IN THE SETTLER COLONIAL PRESENT,” Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Division of Social Sciences, Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, December 2015, 223-232, dml)

And yet, something has changed in this landscape from the initial erasures of Native futurity we drew out in the first chapter. In the narratives of colonial actors like Duncan Campbell Scott, it was absolutely clear that “Indians” were disappearing because their social worlds were being superseded by more “civilized” ways of living and being, ones that these Native subjects would also, inevitably, in the end, adopt (or failing that, perish outright). There was a future. It was simply a settler one. But the nightmare futures of that my Haida interlocutors ward against in their own future-making reach beyond Haida life alone. Environmental collapse, most dramatically, threatens the sustainability of all life; toxins in the land and the waters threaten human lives regardless of their relative indigeneity, race, or gender (e.g. Choy 2011; Crate 2011). Put another way, the impetus for non-Haida (and non-First Nations subjects more generally) to be “united against Enbridge” with their indigenous neighbours comes in no small part because an oil spill also profoundly threatens the lives and livelihoods of non-Aboriginal coastal residents, a fact which Masa Takei, among others, made clear in Chapter 3. Nor is the anxiety that young people might abandon their small town to pursue economic and educational advantage in an urban context limited to reserve communities. Instead, the compulsions of capitalist economic life compel such migrations throughout the globe. The nightmare futures that Haida people constitute alternative futures to ward against are not just future of indigenous erasure under settler colonialism. They are erasures of settler society itself. There is thus an extraordinary political claim embedded in Haida future-making, a claim which gains its power precisely because Haida future-making as we have seen it does not (perhaps cannot) escape from the larger field of settler-colonial determination. Instead, in Haida future-making we find the implicit assertion that Haida people can make futures that address the dilemmas of Haida and settler life alike, ones that can at least “navigate,” to borrow Appadurai’s phrasing, towards possible futures that do not end in absolute erasure. If Povinelli and Byrd are correct and settler liberal governance makes itself possible and legitimate through a perpetual deferral of the problems of the present, then part of the power of Haida future-making is to expose the threatening non-futures that might emerge out of this bracketed present, to expose as lie the liberal promise of a good life always yet to come and to attempt to constitute alternatives.

**Dalley is a critique of settler fiction literature that invokes extinction as a metaphor and uses it to describe the loss of the settlers dominance over colonized communities. It does not indict the validity of our scenarios, nor means that we should not take our impacts into consideration.**

[Hamish **Dalley 2016**] (“The deaths of settler colonialism: extinction as a metaphor of decolonization in contemporary settler literature”, Assistant Professor of English. B.A. University of Otago, <https://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2016.1238160>) xx-xx-2016

I explore this question with reference to examples of contemporary literary treatments of extinction from select English-speaking settler-colonial contexts: South Africa, Australia, and Canada.15 The next section of this article traces key elements of extinction narrative in a range of settler-colonial texts, while the section that follows offers a detailed reading of one of the best examples of a sustained literary exploration of human finitude, Margaret Atwood’s Maddaddam trilogy (2003–2013). I advance four specific arguments. First, extinc- tion narratives take at least two forms depending on whether the ‘end’ of settler society is framed primarily in historical-civilizational terms or in a stronger, biological sense; the key question is whether the ‘thing’ that is going extinct is a society or a species. Second, bio- logically oriented extinction narratives rely on a more or less conscious slippage between ‘the settler’ and ‘the human’. Third, this slippage is ideologically ambivalent: on the one hand, it contains a radical charge that invokes environmentalist discourse and climate-change anxiety to imagine social forms that re-write settler-colonial dynamics; on the other, it replicates a core aspect of imperialist ideology by normalizing whiteness as equivalent to humanity. Fourth, these ideological effects are mediated by gender, insofar as extinction narratives invoke issues of biological reproduction, community protection, and violence that function to differentiate and reify masculine and feminine roles in the puta- tive de-colonial future. Overall, my central claim is that extinction is a core trope through which settler futurity emerges, one with crucial narrative and ideological effects that shape much of the contemporary literature emerging from white colonial settings. The forms of extinction narrative: historical-civilizational vs. biological annihilation Settler-colonial extinction narratives take two broad forms, depending on whether the end they depict is framed in historical-civilizational or biological terms (though the two overlap). The latter type is my primary focus in this article, but I will first briefly consider the former to provide contrast for the biologically inflected narrative. Historical-civiliza- tional visions of the end of settler colonialism invoke classical notions of the rise and fall of societies, plotting the white world’s development within a cyclical temporality that makes inevitable its eventual demise. Such narratives challenge the faith in progress found in stadial theories of development (such as those promulgated by Scottish Enlight- enment figures like Adam Ferguson16) and draw instead on parallels between the fate of modern and classical empires. Gibbon’s History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire becomes a model not only of the past, but also the future. The passage from Schreiner’s African Farm cited above belongs within this tradition, offering a vision of an empty, indif- ferent land (‘the stones will lie on’) populated by waves of humans (the ‘yellow face[d]’ Bushmen; the Boers; the English), each of which gives way to the other until a future in which none are left. J.M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians (1980), published at the height of the struggle against white domination in South Africa, makes this narrative even more explicit. With a title drawn from the neo-classicist poet C.P. Cafavy that invokes the late-Roman parallel,17 Coetzee allegorizes apartheid South Africa as ‘the Empire’, a dying institution that can neither protect its own borders from ‘barbarian’ encroachment nor maintain the veneer of ideological consistency that would justify its violence. As the novel’s protagonist, the Magistrate, contemplates his society’s demise, he comes to realise how the problem of ends is intrinsic to the temporality of settler colonialism: What has made it impossible for us to live in time like fish in water, like birds in air, like chil- dren? It is the fault of Empire! Empire has created the time of history. Empire has located its existence not in the smooth recurrent spinning time of the cycle of the seasons but in the jagged time of rise and fall, of beginning and end, of catastrophe. Empire dooms itself to live in history and plot against history. One thought alone preoccupies the submerged mind of Empire: how not to end, how not to die, how to prolong its era.18 Within this temporality, the future can be glimpsed in the past, as a repetition of previous cycles of destruction and supersession, more or less deferred. The Magistrate thus finds evidence for his fate in archaeology, when he uncovers remnants of a lost civilization that both predates his own and portends its future: ‘Perhaps ten feet below the floor lie the ruins of another fort, razed by the barbarians, peopled with the bones of folk who thought they would find safety behind high walls.’19 As this example implies, historical-civilizational extinction narratives express ambiva- lence about endings that emerges from their affective register. Extinction becomes a fate to be contemplated with fear, but also resignation; because the future is a recapitula- tion of the past, the tone is elegiac rather than apocalyptic, and death becomes a matter of nostalgia more than terror. In Nadine Gordimer’s July’s People (1981), the white family that flees the collapse of apartheid understands its journey into black-dominated rural South Africa as a repeat of the interminable pattern of African history: they follow one of ‘hun- dreds of tracks used since ancient migrations (never ended; her family’s was the latest)’.20 This return to primordial nomadism thrusts Gordimer’s characters into circum- stances of material and agential deprivation, returning them to a condition preceding their accession to racial privilege. They must give up not only the physical comforts accorded by apartheid, but also the capacity to make meaningful decisions about their fate – decisions now made by their erstwhile black servant-turned-protector. This inversion allows the white protagonist Maureen to approach an understanding of how apartheid might have been experienced by its victims; she achieves some insight when she realizes that the historical rupture means she is no longer ‘in possession of any part of her life’.21 From this point of view, the overthrow of settler colonialism becomes an opportunity for settlers’ moral regeneration and subjective transformation. Since history is cyclical, the guilt and inauthenticity generated by settler colonialism becomes incidental to whiteness – once the structures that enshrined his or her control are destroyed, the settler is liberated into a no longer ethically compromised identity. Thus even as Coetzee’s Magistrate finds it ‘as hard as ever to believe that the end is near’,22 he also relishes with ‘elation’ the idea that, were he no longer part of the apparatus of empire, he would be a ‘free man’ who had attained ‘salvation’.23 Historical-civilizational narratives of extinction thereby literally enact what Tuck and Yang call a ‘move to innocence’. By looking beyond the end of settler colonialism, they imagine futures in which ‘settler guilt and complicity’ will be washed away, and the settler him- or herself will metamorphose into a liberated subjectivity.24 Many settler-colonial narratives operate purely within this historical-civilizational regis- ter. However, extinction becomes truly interesting when the metaphor’s biological impli- cations are unlocked. Hints of this can be found in Waiting for the Barbarians. While the Magistrate sees the overthrow of empire as an inevitable expression of the cyclical nature of history, he also finds society’s fate written in local ecology. The ‘barbarians’ are materially impoverished but live lightly on the land; the settlers’ wealth, by contrast, is predicated on an agriculture that is unsustainable in the long term: Every year the lake-water becomes a little more salty. [...] The barbarians know this fact. At this very moment they are saying to themselves, ‘Be patient, one of these days their crops will start withering from the salt, they will not be able to feed themselves, they will have to go.’ That is what they are thinking. That they will outlast us.25 Thus the historical-civilizational pattern of rise and fall – which amounts to a theory of world history that explains and to some extent exonerates settler colonialism – is reinforced by an environmental narrative of decay. The settlers will lose, eventually, because their mode of production is at odds with nature: a fact that violence can delay but never alter. An even more explicit example of such thinking can be found in Alex Miller’s Journey to the Stone Country (2002), a novel that explores the fate of settler colonialism in contemporary Australia. The story begins when the protagonist, Annabelle, is left by her husband and returns from Melbourne to her place of birth, near Townsville in Northern Queensland. Unlike the cosmopolitan metropolis, here Annabelle finds Australia’s settler-colonial dynamics intrusively apparent: ‘Here the past could not be ignored, was not covered over and obscured by the accretions of city life, but was laid bare, the open wounds still visible.’26 The land itself reveals these signs, marks made by the Indigen- ous Australians who are ‘a scattered population [that] had been dispersed and murdered long ago’.27 That visibility forces Annabelle to confront her identity as a settler, one whose existence is predicted on dispossession and for whom it would therefore be legitimate ‘to be hated [... f]or what we’ve stolen from them’.28 In confronting the truth of frontier gen- ocide, Annabelle has to consider the possibility of an end to settler dominion, for she has arrived at a moment when the Indigenous population is resurgent. The change in power relations is represented through a struggle for control of Ranna Station, a pastoral estate owned for five generations by the Biggs family – archetypal colonial settlers committed to the idea of themselves as builders of white civilization – but which has recently been bought by a consortium of Aboriginal groups. In other words, Annabelle is witnessing a historical reversal, the moment at which settler power is broken and control of the land reverts to its Indigenous inhabitants.Miller frames this ‘unimaginable revolution’ in ‘the great wheel of history’29 within the language of biological extinction, inverting its typical application to a presumed Aboriginal past by making it a prophecy of the settlers’ future. Thus Bo Rennie, an Aboriginal surveyor who becomes Annabelle’s lover, gleefully repurposes the language of settler triumph to describe the Biggs clan as having ‘died out’ – ‘Them Biggs turned out to be a vanishing race’, he observes on several occasions.30 The Aboriginal leader Les Marra is even more ambitious. His plan is to dam the valley and flood Ranna Station, obliterating all traces of settler presence and, in so doing, creating an exploitable water resource to fund future projects of Aboriginal enhancement. Marra’s goal is a ‘thousand year plan’ of anti- colonial resistance predicated on the belief that all Aboriginal people have to do to defeat the settlers is to wait for them to die out: This story’s not over yet. The old people not finished yet! That Les Marra and my Arner here, they gonna fight this war for another thousand years. Where’s the white feller gonna be in a thousand years? He’s the one gotta worry about that, not us. We still gonna be here.31 The thousand-year plan (with its ironic invocation of Hitler’s millennium of Aryan supremacy) frames settler colonialism within the radically extended temporality of ecological survival. From this perspective, the material aspects of settler domination are of little importance when compared to the enduring nature of biological life – to which Aboriginal people, by virtue of their 50,000 plus years of residence in Australia, are presumed to be better adapted. This ‘biological’ view of inevitable white extinction forces Annabelle to confront, for the first time, the full implications of the end of settler colonialism: She knew, with a little shock of dismay, with a feeling of personal affront, that Les Marra’s vision of the future would never be reconciled to her existence or to the decency of her own past, the lives of her parents and grandparents. Her existence, indeed, was of no conse- quence to him. There could be no place for her, or for her kind, in the victory he envisaged. Secretly she hoped Les Marra’s crusade would fail, but she knew it would not fail. For Les Marra had only to persist. He had forever. There was no time limit to his strategy.32 The trope of extinction thereby challenges the liberal belief in ‘reconciliation’ as a way out of the structural conflict between settlers and Aborigines.33 Annabelle is in many ways a model settler: she is normatively antiracist, respectful of Aboriginal ways, and self-aware about how she has benefitted from colonialism. But the biological connotations of extinc- tion render such moral-affective qualities irrelevant. The narrative Miller sets in motion frames settler colonialism as an unequal social relationship taking place over the longue durée, within a material, ecologically defined context. From this point of view, individual settlers’ desires and beliefs mean nothing; what matters is that settler colonialism is doomed to fail because it is not attuned to nature.